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: Do Code Violations and Liens Run with the Land?

DO CODE VIOLATIONS AND LIENS RUN WITH THE LAND? CARVING
OUT A CHANGING LANDSCAPE TO SECTION 162.09(3), FLORIDA
STATUTES, WITH ENACTMENT OF SECTION 723.024, FLORIDA
STATUTES, MOBILE HOME PARK LOT TENANCIES
Harry M. Hipler*
This article raises questions about the possible interpretations of section 723.024
of the Florida Statutes as they pertain to code enforcement violations and procedures
against mobile home park owners and mobile home owners in mobile home park lot
tenancies. Ever since the enactment of section 162.09(3) in the 1980s, the
fundamental principle has been that code enforcement violations and liens run with
the land. After section 723.024 of the Florida Statutes became effective on June 2,
2011, the question became whether the legislature has carved out an exception for
mobile home park lot tenancies to bifurcate responsibility between mobile home
owners and mobile home park owners. Literally, section 723.024 of the Florida
Statutes says that each of these parties has their own responsibility in mobile home
park lot tenancies, which is a reversal of approximately thirty years of law and
procedure. Section 723.024 of the Florida Statutes is deceptively simple, as there are
inconsistencies and contradictions contained within this statute. The wording of
section 723.024 of the Florida Statutes undermines long-standing agency and strict
liability principles as to code enforcement law and procedure. Section 723.024 of the
Florida Statutes arguably removes agency and strict liability from section 162.09(3)
of the Florida Statutes as it pertains to mobile home park lot tenancies according to
some legal sources. By enacting what some have suggested is a major exception to
a fundamental paradigm in code enforcement proceedings as applied to mobile home
park lot tenancies, the legislature appears to have involved itself in reshaping code
enforcement procedure and placed itself into the dynamics of mobile home park
owners and mobile home owners’ responsibilities in code enforcement procedure.
There are questions that remain after enactment of section 723.024 of the Florida
Statutes. Is the statute’s wording clear and unambiguous? Does this statute conflict
with the separation of powers doctrine in article I, section 3 of the Florida
Constitution? What effect does the preemption doctrine in article VIII, section 2(b)
of the Florida Constitution have on section 723.024 of the Florida Statutes and local
government code provisions? Does section 723.024 of the Florida Statutes provide
procedural pitfalls and barriers in light of the access to courts provision of article I,
section 21 of the Florida Constitution? Is enforcement of the statute mandatory or
discretionary? Can section 723.024 of the Florida Statutes be construed together and
reconciled with section 162.09(3) of the Florida Statutes? Is there a legal duty by
mobile home park owners to report mobile home owners to local governments if
there appears to be a code violation? Can a local government charge both parties
under civil conspiracy and/or as an accomplice if mobile home park owners knew or
157
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should have known that code violations existed, and neither did anything to report
and correct code violations? In light of the different interpretations that can be given
to section 723.024 of the Florida Statutes and the constitutional questions that have
been raised in this article, can local governments decide for themselves how to
construe and enforce the statute from one local government to another, thereby
causing confusion and a lack of uniformity in local governments’ code enforcement
prosecutions depending on what one local government may believe as distinguished
from another local government?
Until there is a better understanding of the impact and ultimate construction of
section 723.024 of the Florida Statutes, and whether section 162.09(3) of the Florida
Statutes still controls, we will have to wait and see.
I. INTRODUCTION
Florida law has held that code violations and liens “run with the land.”1 This
paradigm has existed since the enactment of Chapter 166 of the Florida Statutes in
1980,2 and has continued to remain intact pursuant to Chapter 162 of the Florida
Statutes.3 Current real property owners have been held responsible for bringing their
real property into compliance with local governments’ (counties and municipalities)
code regulations4 and have been subject to the payment of liens, interest, attorney
fees, and costs if land owners fail to comply with code violations.5 Chapter 162 of
the Florida Statutes grants local governments the power to enforce code provisions
against owners of real property where violations exist.6 Imposing administrative
fines on a per diem basis is permitted until the real property owner remedies the
violations on his or her land and complies with all code enforcement orders.7 Chapter
162 of the Florida Statutes also recognizes that both real property owners and
someone other than real property owners may be responsible for violations of local
________________________
*
Harry M Hipler. Attorney, Dania Beach, Florida. M.A., Political Science, Florida International
University, 2013; M.U.R.P., Florida Atlantic University, 2007; LL.M, Tax, University of Miami, 1981; J.D.,
University of Florida, 1975. “AV” Rated – Martindale Hubbell Law Directory. The author practices primarily in the
areas of commercial litigation, local government law, and domestic relations. He has authored articles in the areas
of local government law, urban and regional planning, and domestic relations.
1.
Henley v. MacDonald, 971 So. 2d 998, 1000 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2008); Monroe Cty. v. Whispering Pines
Assocs., 697 So. 2d 873, 875 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1997); see City of Gainesville Code Enf’t Bd. v. Lewis, 536 So.
2d 1148, 1150 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1988).
2.
FLA. STAT. § 166.059 (1980); see id. §§ 166.051–166.062. “Violator” may include real property owner
or non-real property owner depending on the underlying ordinance. See Op. Att’y Gen. Fla., infra note 107.
3.
See FLA. STAT. §§ 162.01–162.13, 162.21–162.30 (2016). More particularly, see FLA. STAT. § 162.09(3).
4.
See id. § 162.06(5) (requiring the owner of property subject to an enforcement proceeding to disclose the
existence and the nature of the proceeding to any prospective transferee and to disclose in writing to the prospective
transferee that the new owner will be responsible for compliance with the applicable code and with orders issued in
the code enforcement proceeding).
5.
Id. §§ 162.06(5), 162.10.
6.
See id. §§ 162.02, 162.03(2) (local governments are authorized to hold hearings and assess fines); Verdi
v. Metro. Dade Cty., 684 So. 2d 870, 873 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996); Op. Att’y Gen. Fla. No. 2001–77 (2001), 2001
WL 1347157, http://www.myfloridalegal.com/ago.nsf/Opinions/48D41C6174E2007385256AF500729DE2.
7.
FLA. STAT. § 162.09(3) (A certified copy of order imposing a fine once recorded constitutes a lien against
the land on which violation exists and upon any other real and personal property owned by the violator); id. § 162.10
(the duration of lien is no more than twenty years after certified copy of order imposing fine and lien is recorded).
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government code provisions, for the act states that both the “violator” and “the owner
of property that is subject to an enforcement proceeding” are responsible for code
violations under the provisions of Part I, Chapter 162 of the Florida Statutes.8
Mobile homes are an important aspect of the housing market in Florida, and most
mobile homes are located in mobile home parks.9 This has occurred predominantly
on account of the high cost of owning land,10 the impact of zoning ordinances that
frequently restrict placement of mobile homes in mobile home parks,11 and reliance
on a belief that mobile homes are an inexpensive and durable form of housing.12
When section 723.024 of the Florida Statutes became effective on June 2, 2011, the
legislature involved itself in attempting to reshape code enforcement procedure by
placing itself into the dynamics between mobile home park owners and mobile home
owners’ responsibilities in code enforcement violations and liens.13 Section 723.024
of the Florida Statutes has attempted to separate responsibility between mobile home
park owners and mobile home owners. In so doing, the legislature has attempted to
lessen the impact of the fundamental paradigm existing in code enforcement
proceedings since the 1980s that code violations and liens run with the land.14
This article focuses on section 723.024 of the Florida Statutes and its interplay
with Chapter 162 of the Florida Statutes, more particularly section 162.09(3) of the
Florida Statutes concerning enforcement and compliance of code violations. Section
723.024 of the Florida Statutes provides local governments with authority to enforce
its code provisions against non-owners of real property (mobile home owners) whose
acts have resulted in violations in mobile home park lot tenancies, rather than
following the fundamental principle in Florida code enforcement law that code
________________________
8.
Id. §§ 162.06(2), (5).
9.
See Stephen Schreiber, Mobile Homes and Hurricanes: The Crisis in Florida, ACSA INT’L CONF. 39,
41 (2005); Esther Sullivan, Halfway Homeowners: Eviction and Forced Relocation in a Florida Manufactured
Home Park, 39 LAW SOC. INQUIRY 474, 475 (2014). In Florida, there are approximately 7,302,947 total housing
units, and of that number there are 849,304 mobile homes that make up 11.6 percent of the total housing units.
CENSUS
BUREAU,
(October
31,
2011),
Historical
Census
of
Housing
Tables,
U.S.
https://www.census.gov/hhes/www/housing/census/historic/units.html.
10.
Morris A. Davis & Michael G. Palumbo, The Price of Residential Land in Large U.S. Cities, 63 J. URB.
ECON. 352, 353, 361, 367 (2008); Richard Williams et al., The Changing Face of Inequality in Home Mortgage
Lending, 52 SOC. PROBS. 181, 189–90 (2005); see also Rachel E. Dwyer, Expanding Homes and Increasing
Inequalities: U.S. Housing Development and the Residential Segregation of the Affluent, 54 SOC. PROBS. 23, 43
(2007) (discussing how manufactured homes are sought out by lower income families, as opposed to the more
affluent).
11.
Daniel R. Mandelker, Zoning Barriers to Manufactured Housing, 48 URB. L. 233, 236–37, 244–45
(2016); Julia O. Beamish et al., Not a Trailer Anymore: Perceptions of Manufactured Housing, 12 HOUS. POL’Y
DEBATE 373, 377–78 (2001); Casey J. Dawkins & C. Theodore Koebel, Overcoming Barriers to Placing
Manufactured Housing in Metropolitan Communities, 76 J. AM. PLAN. ASS’N 73, 76 (2009); David Ray Papke,
Keeping the Underclass in Its Place: Zoning, the Poor, and Residential Segregation, 41 URB. L. 787, 797 (2009);
see G. Shen, Location of Manufactured Housing and Its Accessibility to Community Services: A GIS-Assisted Spatial
Analysis, 39 SOC. ECON. PLAN. SCI. 25, 26 (2005).
12.
Thomas P. Boehm & Alan Schlottman, Is Manufactured Housing a Good Alternative for Low Income
Households? Evidence from the American Housing Survey, 10 CITYSCAPE 159, 169 (2008); Beamish, supra note
11, at 377; Dawkins, supra note 11, at 74; see Richard Genz, Why Advocates Need to Rethink Manufactured
Housing, 12 HOUS. POL’Y DEBATE 393, 396–97 (2001).
13.
See FLA. STAT. § 723.024 (2011); S. 650, 2011 Leg. (Fla. 2011).
14.
Henley v. MacDonald, 971 So. 2d 998, 1000 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2008); Monroe Cty. v. Whispering Pines
Assoc., 697 So. 2d 873, 875 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1997); see City of Gainesville Code Enf’t Bd. v. Lewis, 536 So. 2d
1148, 1150 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1988); see FLA. STAT. § 723.024 (2016).
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violations and liens run with the land applicable since the inception of Chapter 166
of the Florida Statutes and its successor Chapter 162 of the Florida Statutes.15 This
article also discusses conflicting provisions within section 723.024 of the Florida
Statutes that may subject the statute to varying interpretations in light of its wording
and relevant case law, which calls into question whether section 723.024 of the
Florida Statutes is constitutionally deficient under the separation of powers doctrine
of article II, section 3 of the Florida Constitution and the preemption doctrine of
article VIII, section 2(b) of the Florida Constitution. Finally, in light of the tensions
existing between section 723.024 of the Florida Statutes and section 162.09(3) of the
Florida Statutes, options about construction of these statutes and their interplay are
discussed for future consideration that will allow the reader to determine which
options fit best in light of the relevant case law and long term implications for code
enforcement law and procedure.
II. MOBILE HOME OWNERS OR MOBILE HOME PARK OWNERS: WHO IS THE
“RESPONSIBLE PARTY” ACCORDING TO SECTION 723.024 OF THE FLORIDA
STATUTES?
On June 2, 2011, section 723.024 of the Florida Statutes16 became effective, and
it was intended to help mobile home owners and mobile home park owners determine
which party has responsibility to maintain compliance with local government code
provisions.17 Section 723.024 of the Florida Statutes18 appears to have been created
to allow local governments to enforce code violations against mobile home owners
or mobile home park owners, subject to the criteria listed in sections 723.02219 and
723.023 of the Florida Statutes.20
________________________
15.
FLA. STAT. § 723.024 (2016); see FLA. STAT. §§ 166.051–.062 (1980); FLA. STAT. §§ 162.01–.13 (1985).
16.
FLA. STAT. § 723.024 (2011) (s. 1, ch. 201–105); S. 650, 2011 Leg. (Fla. 2011).
17.
FLA. STAT. § 723.024 (2011) (“Compliance by mobile home park owners and mobile home owners.
Notwithstanding any other provision of this chapter or of any local law, ordinance, or code: (1) If a unit of local
government finds that a violation of a local code or ordinance has occurred, the unit of local government shall cite
the responsible party for the violation and enforce the citation under its local code and ordinance enforcement
authority. (2) A lien, penalty, fine, or other administrative or civil proceeding may not be brought against a mobile
home owner or mobile home for any duty or responsibility of the mobile home park owner under [§] 723.022 or
against a mobile home park owner or mobile home park property for any duty or responsibility of the mobile home
owner under [§] 723.023.”).
18.
Id.
19.
Id.; FLA. STAT. § 723.022 (2016). (“Mobile home park owner’s general obligations—A mobile home
park owner shall at all times: (1) Comply with the requirements of applicable building, housing, and health codes.
(2) Maintain buildings and improvements in common areas in a good state of repair and maintenance and maintain
the common areas in a good state of appearance, safety, and cleanliness. (3) Provide access to the common areas,
including buildings and improvements thereto, at all reasonable times for the benefit of the park residents and their
guests. (4) Maintain utility connections and systems for which the park owner is responsible in proper operating
condition. (5) Comply with properly promulgated park rules and regulations and require other persons on the
premises with his or her consent to comply therewith and conduct themselves in a manner that does not unreasonably
disturb the park residents or constitute a breach of the peace.”).
20.
FLA. STAT. § 723.023 (2016) (“Mobile home owner’s general obligations—A mobile home owner shall
at all times: (1) Comply with all obligations imposed on mobile home owners by applicable provisions of building,
housing, and health codes, including compliance with all building permits and construction requirements for
construction on the mobile home and lot. The home owner is responsible for all fines imposed by the local
government for noncompliance with any local codes. (2) Keep the mobile home lot which he or she occupies clean,
neat, and sanitary, and maintained in compliance with all local codes. (3) Comply with properly promulgated park
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The legislature has specifically defined “Mobile Home Park Lot Tenancies” in
section 723.002(1) of the Florida Statutes as follows: “The provisions of [Chapter
723 Mobile Home Park Lot Tenancies] apply to any residential tenancy in which a
mobile home is placed upon a rented or leased lot in a mobile home park in which
10 or more lots are offered for rent or lease.”21 If a mobile home park falls within the
ambit of section 723.024(1) of the Florida Statutes it appears that either the mobile
home owner or the mobile home park owner may be charged and ultimately held
responsible for code violations, as provided in sections 723.022 and 723.023 of the
Florida Statutes.22 These statutes attempt to enumerate the circumstances where a
party may be responsible,23 and along with section 723.024 of the Florida Statutes,24
make it statutorily prohibited for a local government to charge and adjudicate one
party when the other may be responsible.25
If a mobile home owner does not comply with local government codes on real
property leased from the mobile home park owner, the local government may no
longer be able to charge and adjudicate a fine and a lien against the mobile home
park owner.26 Sections 723.022, 723.023, and 723.024 of the Florida Statutes27 have
sought to describe the circumstances under which a local government may charge
the responsible party, whether it is the mobile home owner or a mobile home park
owner.28 One common situation that is set forth in section 723.023(1) of the Florida
Statutes concerns the undertaking by a mobile home owner who violates a local
government building code by adding an attachment built onto the existing unit
without a building permit.29 Under those circumstances, section 723.023(1) of the
Florida Statutes provides that it is the mobile home owner that is responsible for all
fines and liens imposed by the local government, as the act makes it the mobile home
owner’s responsibility as lessee of the land to obtain “compliance with all building
permits and construction requirements for construction on the mobile home and
lot.”30 After enactment of section 723.024 of the Florida Statutes, the long-standing
________________________
rules and regulations and require other persons on the premises with his or her consent to comply with such rules
and to conduct themselves, and other persons on the premises with his or her consent, in a manner that does not
unreasonably disturb other residents of the park or constitute a breach of the peace.”).
21.
Id. § 723.002(1); Aspen-Tarpon Springs Ltd. P’ship v. Stuart, 635 So. 2d 61, 62–63 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1994); Rowles v. Dep’t of Bus. Reg., 585 So. 2d 319, 321 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991).
22.
Section 723.024 uses the word “may,” and therefore an argument is that “may” is discretionary with a
local government as to whether a party can be charged, leaving open the possibility that a local government retains
discretionary authority to decide which party is responsible that will still provide a local government to decide which
party, or both, should be charged. On account of the statute’s use of “may” and “shall,” a local government may
retain the discretion to file a single charge against one party, or a joint charge against both. See discussions infra
Parts VI and X.
23.
See Pappert v. Mobilinium Assoc., 512 So. 2d 1096, 1097 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1987).
24.
FLA. STAT. § 723.024 (2016).
25.
Id. §§ 723.022–723.024.
26.
Id.
27.
Id.
28.
Id. § 723.024.
29.
Id. § 723.023(1); see Gem Estates Mobile Home Vill. Ass’n, Inc. v. Bluhm, 885 So. 2d 435, 436, 439–
40 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004) (finding where the mobile home owner attached an enclosed screen porch in violation
of a recorded restriction applicable to each mobile home while the decision concerned the enforceability of a
restriction, the setback requirement falls within the ambit of section 723.023 subsection 1 of the Florida Statutes and
potential violations imposed by local government code provisions).
30.
FLA. STAT. § 723.023(1).
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rule that the real property owner, not the tenant, was ultimately responsible for code
violations31 may not apply to mobile home park owners as defined in section
723.002(1) of the Florida Statutes32 on account of what may be a bifurcation of
responsibility pursuant to sections 723.022, 723.023, and 723.024 of the Florida
Statutes.33
III. HISTORY OF CHAPTER 162 OF THE FLORIDA STATUTES
In 1980, the Florida legislature enacted Chapter 166 of the Florida Statutes34 that
later became Chapter 162 of the Florida Statutes,35 which currently outlines code
enforcement procedures.36 “The idea was to take the enforcement of local ordinances
out of the overloaded courts [by having] violations handled in [administrative
proceedings] by local citizen boards.”37 That idea was later amended to include
special magistrates after considering evidence of code compliance officers and
respondents.38 Before 1980, a local government could find a tenant responsible for
local government code violations if the real property owner was not engaged in or
operating a business on the real property.39 After the enactment of Chapter 166 of
the Florida Statutes in 1980,40 it was the owner’s real property, where the code
violations existed, that was ultimately responsible for local government code
violations after a certified copy of an order was recorded.41 By 1985, former Chapter
166 had become Chapter 162 of the Florida Statutes,42 and section 162.09 of the
Florida Statutes read that a certified copy of an order would constitute a lien against
the land on which the violation exists, “or if the violator does not own the land, upon
any other real or personal property owned by the violator.”43 The next material
change occurred by 1987 with an amendment of section 162.09(3) of the Florida
Statutes, where a recorded certified copy of the order would “constitute a lien against
________________________
31.
See id. §§ 723.023(1), 162.09(3).
32.
Id. § 723.002(1).
33.
See id. §§ 723.022–723.024.
34.
FLA. STAT. §§ 166.051–166.062 (1980).
35.
FLA. STAT. §§ 162.01–162.13 (1985).
36.
Id.; FLA. STAT. §§ 162.06–162.07, 162.09–162.10 (2016).
37.
Guide to Code Enforcement in St. Johns County Government, ST. JOHNS COUNTY GOV’T,
http://www.co.st-johns.fl.us/CodeEnforcement/guide.aspx (last visited Nov. 20, 2016). “The idea was to take the
enforcement of local ordinances out of the state court system and have violations handled by local Code Compliance
Inspectors. This law also allowed municipalities to establish an administrative process.” Code Compliance
Homeowner’s Guide, CITY OF PUNTA GORDA, http://www.ci.punta-gorda.fl.us/home/showdocument?id=1068 (last
visited Nov. 20, 2016) (“[E]ducation of the public can be [an] effective tool that Code Enforcement officials have
at their disposal.”)
38.
See FLA. STAT. § 162.03(2) (2016).
39.
See Dep’t of Revenue v. Gen. Am. Transp. Corp., 382 So. 2d 316, 316 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1979); City
of Miami v. Schonfeld, 197 So. 2d 559, 560–61 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1967). The same parties were before the appellate
court on a previous occasion in City of Miami v. Schonfeld, 132 So.2d 767, 768–69 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1961),
involving the interpretation of the city ordinance then in effect.
40.
FLA. STAT. §§ 166.051–166.062 (1980).
41.
Id. § 166.059 (“A certified copy of an order imposing a fine may be recorded in the public records and
thereafter shall constitute a lien against the land on which the violation exists.”).
42.
FLA. STAT. §§ 162.01–162.13 (1985).
43.
Id. § 162.09(3).
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the land on which the violation exists and upon any other real or personal property
owned by the violator.”44
As local government code compliance departments grew, it was common for
mobile home park owners and mobile home owners to violate local code provisions;
both would stay silent out of fear that a mobile home park owner would be per se
responsible, making it difficult for code enforcement officials to find code violations
on real property of all types in local governments.45 Many code violations have been
and are continually being corrected from day to day, but there remain countless
numbers of violations in mobile home park lot tenancies and elsewhere in local
communities.46
IV. THE IMPORTANCE OF AGENCY AND STRICT LIABILITY TO CHAPTER 162 OF
THE FLORIDA STATUTES
Why did the legislature make the owner of real property ultimately responsible
for code violations pursuant to Chapter 166 and Chapter 162 of the Florida Statutes?
By delegating code enforcement to local government quasi-judicial proceedings,
these statutes brought forward a legislative purpose, which was to provide an
expeditious and economically efficient method to obtain code compliance that would
also deter future code violations by current and future owners and violators.47
Otherwise, if fault and cause had to be shown by local governments, protracted and
drawn out proceedings would occur that would result in highly divisive and costly
disputes between a local government, the owner of real property, and the tenant on
the question of who was the responsible party.48
________________________
44.
FLA. STAT. § 162.09(3) (1987).
45.
See Key Largo Ocean Resort Co-Op, Inc. v. Monroe Cty., 5 So. 3d 31, 32 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2009);
Monroe Cty. v. Whispering Pines Assocs., 697 So. 2d 873, 874 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1997); Omari Ben-Shahar et al.,
The Failure of Mandated Disclosure, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 647, 650–63 (2011).
46.
See Kermit J. Lind, Collateral Matters: Housing Code Compliance in the Mortgage Crisis, 32 N. ILL. U.
L. REV. 445, 455–56 (2012); Joseph Schilling, Code Enforcement and Community Stabilization: The Forgotten First
Responders to Vacant and Foreclosed Homes, 2 ALB. GOV’T L. REV. 101, 114–16 (2009); Ezra Rosser, Rural
Housing and Code Enforcement: Navigating Between Values and Housing Types, 13 GEO. J. ON POL’Y 33, 37–39
(2006); Keith H. Hirokawa & Ira Gonzalez, Regulating Vacant Property, 42 URBAN LAWYER 627, 632 (2010); but
see Lea Deutsch, Collateral Damage: Mitigating the Effects of Foreclosure in Communities, 22 TEMP. POL. & CIV.
RTS. L. REV. 203, 212 (2012).
47.
FLA. STAT. § 162.02 (2016); see Raymond J. Burby et al., Improving Compliance with Regulations:
Choices and Outcomes for Local Government, 64 J. ON AMERICAN PLAN. ASS’N, 1, 8 (1998); Margaret L. Smith,
No Property Left Behind: An Exploration of Abandoned Property Policies, 31–33 (2014) (unpublished Masters
thesis, University of Pennsylvania) (on file with Scholarly Commons); Jane Schukoske, The Evolving Paradigm of
Laws on Lead-Based Paint: From Code Violation to Environmental Hazard, 45 S. C. L. REV. 511, 545 (1994)
(discussing purposes of a specific federal law, which include cost-effective means of fulfilling the law); Arun S.
Malik, Self-Reporting and the Design of Policies for Regulating Stochastic Pollution, 24 J. ENVTL. ECON. MGMT.,
241, 254 (1993).
48.
See FLA. CONST. art. V, § 1 (permitting the legislature to grant to “administrative officers or bodies”
“quasi-judicial power in matters connected with the functions of their offices.”); Verdi v. Metro. Dade Cty., 684 So.
2d 870, 874–75 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996) (stating that, pursuant to Article V, § 1, of the state constitution, Dade
County, “as a legislative body[,] would have clear authority to utilize hearing officers to enforce its codes as long as
such enforcement proceedings are only quasi-judicial in nature.”); Anne-Marie C. Carstens, Lurking in the Shadows
of Judicial Process: Special Masters in the Supreme Court’s Original Jurisdiction Cases, 86 MINN. L. REV. 625,
702 (2002).
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One may look to agency theory49 and the strict liability doctrine50 in determining
that the owner of real property is ultimately responsible for code violations, and that
is what section 162.09(3) of the Florida Statutes did by making the owner responsible
upon adjudication, regardless of who caused the code violations or who was at
fault.51 The legislative authority for imposing agency or strict liability on real
property owners flows from section 162.09(3) of the Florida Statutes,52 and it
provides: “an order imposing a fine . . . may be recorded in the public records, and
thereafter shall constitute a lien against the land on which the violation exists and
upon any other real or personal property owned by the violator.”53 A literal reading
of section 162.09(3) of the Florida Statutes54 supports the conclusion that the
recording of a certified copy of a code enforcement order constitutes a lien against
the land on which the violation exists and upon all real and personal property of the
owner regardless of fault and who caused the code violations.55
V. SECTION 723.024 AS APPLIED TO SECTION 162.09(3) OF THE FLORIDA
STATUTES: CONCEPTS OF REPORTING, SELF-REPORTING, AND THIRD PARTY
REPORTING OF CODE VIOLATIONS
What is the legislative goal of section 723.024 of the Florida Statutes? According
to a literal reading of section 723.024 of the Florida Statutes, a mobile home park
owner may now be able to contact a local government without fear of reprisal by the
local government that it will charge a mobile home park owner with code violations
caused by the mobile home owner.56 If a code violation of a mobile home is reported,
section 723.024 of the Florida Statutes may alleviate fears of a mobile home park
owner that he or she will not be responsible for code violations resulting from action
________________________
49.
The purpose of agency law is to restore the status quo after a person chooses to use an agent. In an agency
relationship, one party acts on behalf of another. The foundational principle of agency law is that the principal, who
has chosen to carry out his or her business through an agent, must bear the foreseeable consequences created by that
choice. As the bearer of rewards and risks, the principal is entitled to receive the benefits created by the agency
relationship (rent from a tenant), as well as the burdens created by the agency relationship (wrongdoing by the tenant
that is imputed and attributed onto the principal). This set of principles can be called cost benefit internalization
theory, and generally explains agency law doctrine. See Paula J. Dalley, A Theory of Agency Law, 72 U. PITT. L.
REV. 495, 498 (2011); Susan P. Shapiro, Agency Theory, 31 ANN. REV. OF SOC. 263, 263 (2005); H. Ross, Housing
Code Enforcement and Urban Decline, J. AFFORDABLE HOUS. & CMTY. DEV. L. 6, 29 (1996).
50.
See Richard A. Posner, Strict Liability: A Comment, 2 J. OF LEGAL STUD., 205, 205–06 (1973); Jed
Handelsman Shugerman, The Floodgates of Strict Liability: Bursting Reservoirs and the Adoption of Fletcher v.
Rylands in the Gilded Age, 110 YALE L.J. 333, 333–35 (2000); Saul Levmore, Stipulated Damages, Super-Strict
Liability, and Mitigation in Contract Law, 107 MICH. L. REV. 1365, 1366 (2009).
51.
See FLA. STAT. § 162.09(3) (1987).
52.
Id.
53.
Id.
54.
Id.
55.
Id. § 162.09(3) (2016) (“A certified copy of an order imposing a fine, or a fine plus repair costs, may be
recorded in the public records and thereafter shall constitute a lien against the land on which the violation exists and
upon any other real or personal property owned by the violator. Upon petition to the circuit court, such order shall
be enforceable in the same manner as a court judgment by the sheriffs of this state, including execution and levy
against the personal property of the violator, but such order shall not be deemed to be a court judgment except for
enforcement purposes.”); see City of Boynton Beach v. Janots, 101 So. 3d 864, 865 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2012); Jones
v. City of Winter Haven, 870 So. 2d 52, 53 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003).
56.
See FLA. STAT. § 723.024 (2016).
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or inaction of a mobile home owner.57 If a local government decides to charge a noncompliant mobile home owner based upon the evidence and sections 723.022,
723.023, and 732.024 of the Florida Statutes, it may be the mobile home owner,
rather than the mobile home park owner, that will be responsible for any fines and
liens that may be assessed upon non-compliance, according to one interpretation that
is discussed in this article and elsewhere by legal practitioners.58
Before the enactment of section 723.024 of the Florida Statutes,59 a mobile home
park owner was strictly responsible for code violations resulting from a mobile home
owner’s violations of local government provisions, and that process was consistent
with section 162.09(3) of the Florida Statutes that made the owner of real property
ultimately responsible whether it was the owner, a tenant, or an unknown third party
that may have caused code violations.60 From the inception of the code enforcement
legislation in the1980s, it was not always in the best interest of a mobile home park
owner to contact a local government code enforcement department about tenants’
violations, because the mobile home park owner was ultimately responsible for code
violations resulting from the mobile home owner.61
As the party who was ultimately responsible for correcting any violations, before
June 2, 2011, the mobile home park owner had to comply with final orders or be
subject to an assessment of fines and liens levied by the local government according
to Section 162.09(3) of the Florida Statutes.62 The strict responsibility that resulted
from Chapter 162 of the Florida Statutes was further exacerbated by the fact that
mobile home park owners were subject to the discretion of local governments’
boards and special magistrates, even if the code violation was due to the acts of a
mobile home owner.63 Once code enforcement claims were adjudicated, the mobile
home park owner was ultimately responsible and subject to fines and liens, and
depending on how much time it took to obtain compliance by the mobile home owner
or rid the violator from residing in the mobile home park, the fines and liens could
escalate if compliance with the final order did not occur by a certain date.64 It was
possible that the uncapped fines imposed on a mobile home park owner could be
allowed to accrue until there was compliance with the final order that was entered
________________________
57.
Id. § 723.024(2).
58.
See Scott Gordon, New Law May Help Manufactured Housing ROCs Deal with Code Violations, FLA.
ROC (June 23, 2011), http://www.floridaroc.com/2011/06/articles/news-of-note-for-rocs/new-law-may-helpmanufactured-housing-rocs-deal-with-code-violations/; Florida Statute 723.024, THE RICHARDSON LAW GROUP
(June 23, 2011), http://www.richardslawgroup.com/rlg/florida-statute-723-024/. These commentaries were written
shortly after enactment of the statute by private lawyers, but they do not discuss or raise the questions made in this
article. Only time will tell how section 723.024 of the Florida Statutes will be construed.
59.
FLA. STAT. § 162.09(3) (2016).
60.
See FLA. STAT. § 162.09(3) (1987); Monroe Cty. v. Whispering Pines Assocs., 697 So. 2d 873, 874 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1997) (holding that “code violations ‘run with the land’ and subsequent purchasers can be held
responsible for bringing their property up to code”).
61.
See Wilson v. Cty. of Orange, 881 So. 2d 625, 627–28 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004) for an example of how
things can go from bad to worse for a mobile home park owner and a mobile home owner.
62.
See FLA. STAT. § 162.09(3) (1987).
63.
Id.; see also Monroe Cty., 697 So. 2d at 874; Henley v. MacDonald, 971 So. 2d 998, 1000 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 2008); City of Gainesville Code Enf’t Bd. v. Lewis, 536 So. 2d 1148, 1151 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1988).
64.
See Broward Cty v. Recupero, 949 So. 2d 274, 275 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2007); Jones v. City of Winter
Haven, 870 So. 2d 52, 53 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003); Moustakis v. City of Ft. Lauderdale, No. 08–60124, 2008 WL
2222101, at *1 (S.D.Fla. 2008), aff’d, 388 F. App’x 820 (11th Cir. 2009).
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against the mobile home park.65 Even after compliance occurred on the subject real
property, liens entered against a mobile home park owner might be difficult to reduce
through local government administrative procedures, and even if they were mitigated
or abated, the mobile home park owner was still responsible to pay whatever amount
the lien was reduced, pursuant to an abatement or mitigation proceeding.66
An option open to mobile home park owners before enactment of section
723.024 of the Florida Statutes was for a mobile home park owner to file an eviction
action pursuant to section 723.061 of the Florida Statutes67 and/or for removal of
mobile home owner/tenant, pursuant to section 723.062 of the Florida Statutes,68 if
the mobile home owner failed to comply with local government code provisions.69
By attempting to remove the violator from the mobile home park, the owner of the
mobile home park showed a good faith effort to rid the violator from the land, and
after doing so, the mobile home park owner could move toward obtaining
compliance with existing code violations after the mobile home owner was
removed.70 There was no guarantee that the local government would extend a
compliance date based upon a mobile home park owner’s good faith efforts to correct
violations to obtain compliance, but this was a method to show a good faith attempt
to obtain compliance by attempting to remove the tenant.71
Can it be argued that sections 723.022, 723.023, and 723.024 of the Florida
Statutes72 favor the mobile home park owner or the mobile home owner?73 These
statutes attempt to set forth responsibility between mobile home owners and mobile
home park owners.74 Still, it is hard to imagine a situation where a mobile home park
owner and mobile home owner are on an equal footing and bargaining position—
whether it be for the payment of rent, removal of a mobile home, or maintenance of
their respective property—because the mobile home park owner owns and runs the
park and has a great deal of control over the rules and regulations in its park, subject
to compliance with Chapter 723 of the Florida Statutes.75 It takes time for a mobile
________________________
65.
See FLA. STAT. 162.09(3) (2016); Jones, 870 So. 2d at 54; Fong v. Town of Bay Harbor Islands, 864 So.
2d 76, 78 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003); Cty. Collection Services, Inc. v. Allen, 650 So. 2d 650, 650 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1995).
66.
FLA. STAT. § 162.09(2)(c) (2016) (providing that a code enforcement board or special magistrate may
reduce a code enforcement fine before the order imposing such fine has been recorded); City of Miami v. Cortex,
995 So. 2d 604, 605 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2008); Op. Att’y Gen. Fla. No. 2002-62 (2002),
http://www.myfloridalegal.com/ago.nsf/Opinions/80125F88720EF64485256C3100570ABC; Op. Att’y Gen. Fla.,
No. 99-03 (1999), http://www.myfloridalegal.com/ago.nsf/Opinions/4988FF55164E531D852566FF00564FE1.
67.
FLA. STAT. § 723.061(1)(b) (2016).
68.
Id. §§ 723.061(1)(b), 723.062.
69.
See Wilson v. Cty. of Orange, 881 So. 2d 625, 627 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004).
70.
See id. at 627; see FLA. STAT. §§ 723.061–723.062 (2016). In its aftermath, we can only hope that the
local government, in its actions, considered its actions as improper if the allegations made by the mobile home park
owner proved to be true and correct.
71.
See FLA. STAT. § 162.09 (2)(b) (2016) (“In determining the amount of the fine, if any, the enforcement
board shall consider . . . [a]ny actions taken by the violator to correct the violation.”).
72.
Id. §§ 723.022–723.024.
73.
Id.
74.
Id.
75.
See FLA. STAT. § 723.037 for rules and procedure changes. See also Sun Valley Homeowners, Inc. v.
American Land Lease, Inc., 927 So. 2d 259, 263–64 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2006); Homeowners Corp. of River Trails
v. Saba, 626 So. 2d 274, 275 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1993); Connelly v. Old Bridge Village Co-Op, Inc., 915 So. 2d
652, 654 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2005). The relationship between mobile home parks and mobile home owners is replete
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home owner to remove himself or herself from a mobile home park, and if removal
occurs, where does the mobile home owner go? When a mobile home owner
transfers and sells his or her home to a third party, the successor owner will take the
mobile home “as is,” which could include code violations existing on the mobile
home that may make the successor responsible for code violations the owner had no
way of knowing existed, but that the mobile home park knew existed.76 By removing
agency and strict liability from the responsibility of mobile home park owners, longstanding code violations existing on a mobile home could become the responsibility
of a successor mobile home owner.77 Section 723.024 of the Florida Statutes may
also constitute a method of reallocation in private funding regarding financial
responsibility between mobile home owners, who are less able to correct code
violations, and mobile home park owners, who may now be in a better position to
escape responsibility for acts they knew or should have known existed on their land
but did nothing to escape responsibility in the past.78
In a tug-of-war as to financial responsibility, which party will have greater power
and be in a superior position to face and accept or escape responsibility?79 The
legislature has attempted to bifurcate responsibility in sections 723.022, 723.023,
and 723.024 of the Florida Statutes in what was deemed to be an equitable manner,
and the mobile home owner is left with the responsibility of complying with any
code violations on the purchased mobile home whether he or she had anything to do
with the code violations, while the mobile home park owner escapes responsibility
and may be free to report code violations without fear of reprisal by the local
government.80
On a positive note, there is a common thread and interest that mobile home park
owners and mobile home owners may share by enactment of section 723.024 of the
Florida Statutes. By making both responsible for designated code violations, this
statute may ensure that their respective surroundings in a mobile home park can be
________________________
with complexities in property interests and responsibilities. Mobile home owners as tenants in mobile home parks
own their homes, but they usually lease the land from the park. Some can be situated on unplaited lots as existed in
Connelly. The land each home owner leased in a ninety-nine-year lease involved uncertainty between two mobile
home owners and the park where the district court discussed the uncertainty that can arise concerning the boundaries
and rights that various lot holders may exercise over their property during tenancies. See generally Chapter 723 of
the Florida Statutes, which addressed mobile home lot tenancies.
76.
See Key Largo Ocean Resort Co-Op, Inc. v. Monroe Cty., 5 So. 3d 31, 32 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2009) for
a demonstration of the power and the patience of one local government involving the character of a campground
that had changed for residents who built permanent structures and what became mobile homes, which did not comply
with the local government’s zoning restrictions making code enforcement proceedings a viable alternative. The real
property was originally zoned as a Recreational Vehicle District where permanent structures were not allowed. Key
Largo Ocean Resort Co-Op, Inc. was litigated before enactment of section 723.024 of the Florida Statutes, but sets
forth an example where mobile home owners and a mobile home park were both responsible for the change in use
resulting in code violations that were at odds with the existing zoning regulations.
77.
Id.
78.
Candace Myers et al., Social Vulnerability and Migration in the Wake of Disaster: The Case of
Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, 29 POPULATION AND ENV’T 27, 274 (2008); see Richard Williams et al., The Changing
Face of Inequality in Home Mortgage Lending, 52 SOC. PROBLEMS, 181, 190 (2005); Katherine MacTavish et al.,
Housing Vulnerability Among Rural Trailer-Park Households, 13 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL’Y 95, 96 (2006).
79.
See FLA. STAT. § 723.24 (2016); Pilgrim v. Crescent Lake Mobile Colony, Inc., 582 So. 2d 649, 651–52
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991).
80.
No argument is made that section 723.024 of the Florida Statutes is unconscionable because that would
be nearly impossible to demonstrate. See Belcher v. Kier, 558 So.2d 1039, 1042 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
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jointly maintained in accordance with local governments’ code provisions.81
Whatever the consequences of section 723.024 of the Florida Statutes, whether code
violations are the responsibility of a mobile home owner or a mobile home park
owner, both should be respectful of the policy of Chapter 162 that emphasizes its
intention to “promote, protect, and improve the health, safety, and welfare of the
citizens of the counties and municipalities of this state.”82 While local governments
have jurisdiction to enforce code violations pursuant to Chapter 162 of the Florida
Statutes, we can return to the chapter’s fundamental goal: to make the public
recognize that by maintaining high quality business and residential neighborhoods
that are compliant with local governments’ code provisions, the health, safety, and
welfare of the community will be kept intact.83 That objective should also enhance
the quality of life of a neighborhood’s residents and business owners, which will
ensure an increase in local governments’ taxes as the real property gradually
increases in value, and that should help support local governments’ services.84
By making each party responsible for designated violations that are listed in
sections 723.022, 723.023, and 723.024 of the Florida Statutes,85 each party is
required to keep its own surroundings free and clear of code violations without
imposing agency or strict liability onto the mobile home park owner by acts of a
mobile home owner that occur after June 2, 2011.86 Thus, a mobile home owner is
responsible for some designated matters, whereas mobile home park owners are
responsible for other designated matters.87 That is at least one interpretation of
section 723.024 of the Florida Statutes before any judicial construction of the statute.
Yet this interpretation cannot rule out the possibility that both might be responsible
based on the facts and circumstances of a case.88

________________________
81.
FLA. STAT. §§ 723.022–723.023 (2016). In a decision before the enactment of Chapter 162, the appellate
court stated: “The owner and the tenants of a mobile home park have a common interest in a guarantee that their
surroundings will be pleasant and maintained according to a certain standard.” Blair v. Mobile Home Cmtys., Inc.,
345 So. 2d 1101, 1103 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1977).
82.
FLA. STAT. § 162.02 (2016).
83.
Id.
84.
Id.; Harry M. Hipler, Developments in the Law on Local Government Code Enforcement Proceedings:
Quasi-Judicial Proceedings Pursuant to Chapter 162, Florida Statutes, 42 STETSON L. REV. 681, 682–83 (2013);
Ezra Rosser, Rural Housing and Code Enforcement: Navigating Between Values and Housing Types, 13 GEO. J. ON
POVERTY L. & POL’Y 33, 80 (2006); Joseph Schilling, Code Enforcement and Community Stabilization: The
Forgotten First Responders to Vacant and Foreclosed Homes, 2 ALB. GOV’T L. REV. 101, 149 (2009); see also
Raymond J. Burby, et al., Building Code Enforcement Burdens and Central City Decline, 66 J. OF AMERICAN
PLANN. ASS’N 143, 144 (2000); see generally Kyle McCollum, Top Ten Building Code Violations in Florida, 3, 36
(2004) (unpublished thesis, University of Florida) (on file with the George A. Smathers Libraries, University of
Florida).
85.
FLA. STAT. §§ 723.022–723.024 (2016).
86.
Id. §§ 162.09(3), 723.024.
87.
See id. §§ 723.022–723.024; Pappert v. Mobilinium Assocs. V, 512 So. 2d 1096, 1097–98 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1987) (outlining duties of mobile park owners); see Pilgrim v. Crescent Lake Mobile Colony, 582 So. 2d 649,
651–52 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991).
88.
See discussion infra Parts IX–XI.; see also David T. Kraut, Hanging Out the No Vacancy Sign:
Eliminating the Blight of Vacant Buildings from Urban Areas, 74 N.Y.U.L. REV. 1139 (1999).
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VI. ALTERNATIVE INTERPRETATIONS AND QUESTIONS ABOUT SECTION
723.024 OF THE FLORIDA STATUTES
The enactment of section 723.024 of the Florida Statutes raises questions about
its enforceability. First, does the local government retain discretion to decide which
party is responsible, or is the local government required to follow sections 723.022,
723.023, and 723.024 of the Florida Statutes? Second, assuming that a mobile home
is personal property (as long as it is not permanently attached to the land), how is a
local government to obtain in rem jurisdiction and service so that a mobile home
owner can be charged with code violations? Third, is there a duty upon a mobile
home park owner to report a violator to the local government after enactment of
section 723.024 of the Florida Statutes if it becomes aware of code violations
resulting from the action or inaction of a mobile home owner? Finally, what if a
mobile home park owner fails to report a code violation by ignoring a mobile home
owner’s violations—can there be any civil or code enforcement repercussions
against the mobile home park owner?
Before enactment of section 723.024 of the Florida Statutes, agency and strict
liability applied in making a mobile home park owner ultimately responsible for any
code violations resulting from acts of a mobile home owner.89 However, in what may
be a newly created relationship after enactment of section 723.024 of the Florida
Statutes,90 there is the possibility that sections 723.022, 723.023, and 723.024 of the
Florida Statutes can be construed to create a new partnership and agency relationship
that bifurcates responsibility between mobile home park owners and mobile home
owners.91 This means that the legislature may have removed agency and strict
liability from section 162.09(3) of the Florida Statutes as applied to mobile home
park lot tenancies.92 It is premature to conclude that agency and strict liability have
been completely removed on account of section 723.024 of the Florida Statutes, as
it is necessary to look at the wording of this statute that suggests that there are
problematic inconsistencies and contradictions within this statute that need to be
resolved.
A. Section 723.024(1) of the Florida Statutes Uses “Shall” and Section
723.024(2) Uses “May” So Which Is It?
Section 723.024(1) of the Florida Statutes provides that the local government
“shall” charge the responsible party for the violation and enforce the citation under
its local code enforcement authority.93 Yet section 723.024(2) of the Florida
Statutes94 provides that an administrative or civil proceeding “may” not be brought
against anyone other than the responsible party for the reasons outlined in section
________________________
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.

See discussion supra Part IV.
See FLA. STAT. § 723.024 (2016); see Malik, supra note 47.
FLA. STAT. §§ 723.022–723.024 (2016).
See id. § 162.09(3); discussion supra Part IV.
FLA. STAT. § 723.024(1) (2016).
Id. § 723.024(2).
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723.022 of the Florida Statutes (mobile home park owner)95 and section 723.023 of
the Florida Statutes (mobile home owner).96 There is an apparent inconsistency
within these statutes as one portion of section 723.024(1) of the Florida Statutes uses
“shall” which is mandatory,97 whereas section 723.024(2) of the Florida Statutes uses
“may” which is discretionary.98 These inconsistencies raise a fundamental question:
Does section 723.024(1) of the Florida Statutes make this provision mandatory, and
does section 723.024(2) of the Florida Statutes grant local governments’ discretion
to decide who should be charged and what charges can be made?99
While one can argue that the intent of the statute was to help mobile home park
owners and mobile home owners determine which party is the responsible party,100
the inconsistency within section 723.024 of the Florida Statutes might allow local
governments to decide who to charge and what violations to charge a mobile home
owner and mobile home park owner.101 It is too early to tell how section 723.024 of
the Florida Statutes may be interpreted, so until there is a judicial interpretation of
this statute,102 or an Attorney General’s opinion,103 the tension existing within section
723.024 of the Florida Statutes, and between sections 723.024 and 162.09(3) of the
Florida Statues, may be left to the discretionary authority of local governments.104
This is so because judicial decisions have shown great deference to agency and local
government rulings when faced with a problem of statutory construction, as they are
best suited to know how local codes ought to be interpreted within their local
bodies.105 If tension continues to exist, then section 723.024 of the Florida Statutes
may be interpreted different ways by various local governments depending upon
their local officials’ judgments.106
________________________
95.
Id. §§ 723.022, 724.024(2).
96.
Id. § 723.023.
97.
Id. § 723.024(1); Kaweblum v. Thornhill Est. Homeowner Ass’n Inc., 755 So. 2d 85, 87 (Fla. 2000)
(citing Chaky v. State, 651 So. 2d 1169, 1172 (Fla. 1995)).
98.
FLA. STAT. § 723.024(2) (2016); Kaweblum, 755 So. 2d at 87 (citing Chaky, 651 So. 2d at 1172).
99.
See Henderson v. Bowden, 737 So. 2d 532, 533 (Fla. 1999); City of Pinellas Park v. Brown, 604 So. 2d
1222, 1227 (Fla. 1992); see also Milanese v. City of Boca Raton, 84 So. 3d 339, 343 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2011)
(While these cases discuss sovereign immunity, they also suggest that where a zone of risk is created by a third
party, liability may extend to the parties which create a zone of risk.).
100.
See discussion supra Part V.
101.
See FLA. STAT. § 723.024 (2016); Kaweblum, 755 So. 2d at 87 (citing Chaky, 651 So.2d at 1172).
102.
See generally Walton Cty. v. Stop Beach Renourishment, 998 So. 2d 1102, 1109 (Fla. 2008) (discussing
the de novo review of a lower court’s decision on the constitutionality of a statute).
103.
Frequently
Asked
Questions
About
Atty.
Gen.
Opinions,
ATT’Y GEN. FLA.,
http://myfloridalegal.com/pages.nsf/Main/dd177569f8fb0f1a85256cc6007b70ad (last visited April 17, 2017)
(explaining that on questions of statutory interpretation, the Attorney General can render a non-binding opinion that
is only persuasive).
104.
FLA. STAT. § 723.024(1) (2016). A compelling argument can be made that section 723.024(1) specifically
says that the local government, “shall cite the responsible party for the violation and enforce the citation under its
local code and ordinance enforcement authority.” Id. § 723.024(1). Since each local government has its own
building, housing, and health codes and regulations, is it not the local government that is best suited to decide which
party is responsible? See discussion infra Part VII; see also Panama City Beach Cmty. Redevelopment Agency v.
State, 831 So. 2d 662, 665–69 (Fla. 2002); Flo-Sun, Inc. v. Kirk, 783 So. 2d 1029, 1037–38 (Fla. 2001).
105.
See Samara Dev. Corp. v. Marlow, 556 So. 2d 1097, 1098 (Fla. 1990); Graham v. Estuary Prop. Inc.,
399 So. 2d 1374, 1379 (Fla. 1981).
106.
See Samara Dev. Corp., 556 So. 2d at 1098; Graham, 399 So. 2d at 1379.
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B. Establishing In Rem Jurisdiction Over Mobile Home Owners in Light
of Section 723.024 of the Florida Statutes
Another issue with section 723.024 of the Florida Statutes is the question of
notice and service upon a mobile home owner and whether in rem jurisdiction can
be obtained in code enforcement proceedings. Since 1980, local governments have
prosecuted code violations against the owners of real property in accordance with
Chapter 166 of the Florida Statutes.107 Section 166.062 of the Florida Statutes108
formerly provided that: “[a]ll notices . . . shall be by certified mail, return receipt
requested, or, when mail would not be effective, by hand delivery by the code
inspector.”109 Its successor, section 162.12(1)(a) of the Florida Statutes,110 has
provided for years that the violator will be provided with notice by hand delivery, or
mailed by certified mail, return receipt requested, to the address listed in the tax
collector’s office for tax notices, or to the address listed in the county property
appraiser’s database, or publication, or posting on the subject real property as
provided in section 162.12(1)(a) of the Florida Statutes.111 To make certain that
adequate notice has been afforded to mobile home owners, local governments may
also provide additional notice to any other address of a violator that is found for the
property owner in addition to service by publication or posting on the subject of real
property.112
Assuming that mobile homes with code violations may be charged in lieu of
mobile home park owners, with the enactment of section 723.024,113 the reader needs
to be reminded that mobile homes constitute personal property, not land, and
therefore mobile homes are subject to a license tax, unless the mobile home is
permanently situated and affixed to the land, in which case they are part of the
land.114 The question raised from this possible change in responsibility is that
because mobile homes are personal property, how should mobile homes be noticed
in order to comply with section 162.12 of the Florida Statutes115 and federal and state
constitutional due process?116 While the method of service on mobile homes is not
specifically provided by statute, it appears that federal and state constitutional law
may require hand delivery, mailing, posting, and/or publication.117 If that is the case,
then the legislature needs to amend the existing statute so there is no question about
________________________
107.
FLA. STAT.
§
166.056
(1980);
Op.
Att’y
Gen.
Fla.,
No.
81-62
(1981),
http://www.myfloridalegal.com/ago.nsf/Opinions/5BDF3D7B5932364D8525658700551D4A.
108.
FLA. STAT. § 166.062 (1980).
109.
Id.
110.
FLA. STAT. § 162.12(1)(a) (2016).
111.
See id. § 162.12(1)(2). This section sets forth with specificity how notice may be provided to the owner
that may include notice to an additional address at the option of the local government. Id. However, without
legislative direction the question is, does this apply to mobile home owners? And if so, how?
112.
Id. § 162.12(1)(a).
113.
Id. § 723.024, see discussion supra Part II.
114.
FLA. STAT. § 320.015 (2016); see Gen. Elec. Cap. Corp. v. Gerald Sohn, 566 So. 2d 841, 842 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1990).
115.
FLA. STAT. § 162.12 (2016).
116.
Mennonite Bd. of Missions v. Adams, 462 U.S. 791, 801 (1983); see Gen. Elec. Cap. Corp., 566 So. 2d
at 843.
117.
See Mennonite Bd. of Missions, 462 U.S. at 793, 799–801.
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what constitutes valid notice and service in accordance with federal and state
constitutional due process requirements.118
C. Reporting Code Violations: Is It Mandatory or Discretionary for the
Mobile Home Park Owner in Light of Section 723.024 of the Florida
Statutes?
Is there a legal duty by mobile home park owners to report code violations?
While there should be no reluctance by a mobile home park owner to report a mobile
home owner’s code violations to the local government, according to a literal reading
of section 723.024 of the Florida Statutes, this form of reporting (whether it is called
self-reporting, third-party reporting, or simply reporting) by a non-offending party is
supposedly designed to control and correct code violations by the use of policing
partnerships between a local government and a mobile home park owner.119
However, theory and practice are qualitatively different, and they both need to be
reconciled so that the purpose of legislation and governance converge.120 If reporting
by a non-offending party is a goal of section 723.024 of the Florida Statutes,
reporting may not have been in the best interest of a mobile home park owner in its
routine activities before enactment of section 723.024 of the Florida Statutes, thereby
suggesting a disconnect between a mobile home park owners’ goal of showing a
profit and local governments’ goal of obtaining compliance with code violations on
account of the strict liability resulting from section 162.09(3) of the Florida
Statutes.121 The reason is that reporting of a code violation by a mobile home park
owner would subject itself to potential fines and liens that could be assessed against
the mobile home park owner, regardless of fault, if the local government learned of
the code violations.122
________________________
118.
See generally id. (describing different means of providing notice). Until the legislature clarifies the
situation, local governments should consider posting the code violation at the mobile home and citing the record
title owner of the mobile home after obtaining the vehicle identification number (VIN) and license tag number of
the mobile home for service. The mobile home park owner should have information about the mobile home,
including title certificate, VIN, and license tag number, and that information should be shared with local government
code enforcement officers. If the mobile home park owner fails to have this information, it might be obtained by
looking outside on the frame of the mobile home and/or inside the mobile home, which would require the occupant’s
consent to gain entry. The VIN may be called a manufacturer’s serial number on the data plate depending on the age
of the mobile home, and the VIN may be found inside and on the wall of the master bedroom closet, near the back
door, under the kitchen sink, on the inside of a cabinet door, in the furnace compartment, on the utility room wall,
on cabinet doors, near electric panel, or elsewhere inside. See OLD REPUBLIC TITLE INSURANCE GROUP, TRAILERS,
MOBILE
HOMES,
AND
MANUFACTURED
HOUSING
UNITS
6.70
(Nov.
2007),
http://www.oldrepublictitle.com/ganational/Guides/Mobile%20Homes%20Revised%2011-07.pdf. It is also
incumbent on the local government to make certain that the final order imposed by the special magistrate comply
with sections 162.09(3), 55.081, 55.10, 55.202–55.205 of the Florida Statutes, subject to corrections at a later date,
so that the final order subjects the personal property to a fine and lien.
119.
See Malik, supra note 47.
120.
See Mariana Valverde, Jurisdiction and Scale: Legal “Technicalities” as Resources for Theory, 18 SOC.
& LEGAL STUD. 139, 140 (2009); Darren Sinclair, Self-Regulation Versus Command and Control? Beyond False
Dichotomies, 19 L. & POL’Y 529, 532 (1997).
121.
See FLA. STAT. §162.09(3) (2016). Disclosure of violations by a violator has been the subject of many
research studies due to the fear of lives and penalties. Robert Innes, Violator Avoidance Activities and Self-Reporting
in Optimal Law Enforcement, J. OF L., ECON., AND ORG. 239–256 (2001).
122.
See FLA. STAT. §162.09(3) (2016).
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D. By Failing to Report a Code Violation, Does a Mobile Home Park
Owner Place Itself into a Foreseeable Zone of Risk?
In light of the enactment of section 723.024 of the Florida Statutes, what if a
mobile home park owner ignores code violations resulting from a mobile home
owner’s action or inaction over a period of time? Are there any legal ramifications
if there is silence and a failure to report code violations by a mobile home park
owner? A Florida appellate court has specifically stated that if a mobile home park
owner “created a foreseeable zone of risk” then there could be liability in a personal
injury action.123 In Hanrahan v. Hometown America, LLC,124 a mobile home park
owner/landlord was sued by a mobile home owner/tenant on account of fire ants that
bit the tenant on the face and the neck as he walked his dog after he inadvertently
brushed up against community bushes that were to be cared for by the mobile home
park owner/landlord.125 The mobile home park owner did not have specific
knowledge of the hazard presented by the fire ants to the premises where the tenants
resided, although the landlord’s duty included spraying insecticide alternative
months in order to kill ants, in addition to treatment of any visible ant mounds with
granules.126 The appellate court affirmed a summary judgment in favor of the mobile
home park owner, and ruled that there was no duty owed to the tenant to guard
against the red ants under these circumstances as the red ants were wild animals
pursuant to the doctrine of ferae naturae.127 However, the appellate court indicated
that the proper inquiry was whether the landlord’s conduct “created a foreseeable
zone of risk,”128 rather than whether the landlord could foresee the specific injury
that actually occurred.129 Thus, if a mobile home park owner knew or should have
known about a mobile home owner’s code violations, the mobile home park owner
might be held responsible for not correcting code violations as a participant.130 By
failing to report code violations to the local government, this could worsen existing
code violations making the mobile home park owner part and parcel to the mobile
homeowner’s misconduct, resulting in a foreseeable zone of risk on account of
known circumstances that worsened over a period of time,131 thereby exposing
________________________
123.
Hanrahan v. Hometown Am. LLC, 90 So. 3d 915, 917 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2012).
124.
See generally id.
125.
Id. at 916–17.
126.
“Pinelake maintenance and office staff testified that in addition to the exterminator’s insecticide
treatments, the maintenance staff would treat any visible mounds with granules.” Id. at 917.
127.
Id. at 916.
128.
Id. at 917.
129.
Id.
130.
See Key Largo Ocean Resort Co-Op Inc. v. Monroe Cty., 5 So. 3d 31, 34–35 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2009).
This case is a demonstration of the power and the patience of one local government involving the character of a
campground that had changed for residents who built permanent structures and what became mobile homes, which
did not comply with the local government’s zoning restrictions making code enforcement proceedings a viable
alternative. The real property was originally zoned as a Recreational Vehicle District where permanent structures
were not allowed. Key Largo Ocean Resort Co-Op, Inc. was litigated before enactment of section 723.024 of the
Florida Statutes, but sets forth an example how mobile home owners and a mobile home park had to have been
responsible for the change in use resulting in code violations that were at odds with the existing zoning regulations.
131.
Kolosky v. Winn Dixie Stores, Inc., 472 So. 2d 891, 895 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985) (explaining a
foreseeable risk of harm); see generally Johns-Manville Sales Corp. v. Janssens, 463 So. 2d 242, 248–49 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1984) (addressing foreseeable zone of risk liability that could fall partly on the mobile home park owners).
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mobile home park owners to potential responsibility.132 While there does not appear
to be any state statute requiring the public to report code violations,133 there is an
implicit obligation on the public to do so by acts of public service so that serious
violations that may endanger the public safety are reported and investigated.134
Whether section 723.024 of the Florida Statutes creates a legal duty on a mobile
home park owner to report code violations to its local government is an issue that
may need to be resolved by the judiciary.135 Although section 723.024 of the Florida
Statutes does not specifically say that a mobile home park owner is under a legal
duty to report code violations resulting from the acts of a mobile home owner/tenant,
a goal of section 723.024 of the Florida Statutes may have been to encourage mobile
home park owners to report code violations to local governments without necessarily
________________________
132.
See Hanrahan v. Hometown Am. LLC, 90 So. 3d 915, 917 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2012) (relying upon
McCain v. Florida Power Corp, 593 So. 2d 500, 504 (Fla. 1992), which explained that: “[t]he duty element of
negligence focuses on whether the defendant’s conduct foreseeably created a broader ‘zone of risk’ that poses a
general threat of harm to others.”). While section 723.024 of the Florida Statutes and the decisions in Hanrahan may
have different purposes, there should be no question that if a mobile home park owner sees a mobile home owner
violating a local building code with an attachment built onto their unit among any other code violations, it should
not just sit back, but rather it should report the code violation with due diligence and promptly report the violations
caused by the mobile home owner to the local government, or else it is entirely possible that by sitting back the
mobile home park owner could be part of a larger scheme involving the creation of a zone of risk and foreseeability
in a spider web of conduct that created a broader “zone of risk” that poses a threat of harm to others. Accordingly,
in addition to notifying the local government, the mobile home park owner ought to work with the local government
and provide notice to the mobile home owner of the code violation in a civil action involving a breach of lease
agreement by claiming that there is a failure to comply with local government code provisions, requiring a removal
of tenant/eviction action against the mobile home owner should he or she fail or refuse to comply with the local
government code provision. See FLA. STAT § 723.062 (2016).
133.
See FLA. STAT § 162.06 (2016). As to reporting of code violations, the only mention in Chapter 162
states: “(1) It shall be the duty of the code inspector to initiate enforcement proceedings of the various codes;
however, no member of a board shall have the power to initiate such enforcement proceedings.” Id. A board member
should be free to report code violations as a member of the general public. Further, there is nothing specifically
stated in subsections 723.022–723.024 about any requirement to report code violations, yet it would almost seem
implausible if a code violation is not reported by neighbors in such close knit premises where a code violation could
impact nearby neighbors. See Zuccarelli v. Barfield, 199 So. 3d 399, 406 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2016).
134.
See generally A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, The Econ. Theory of Public Enforcement of Law,
38 J. OF ECON. LITERATURE 45, 66 (2000) (discussing the importance of self-reporting); see Donald J. Black, The
Mobilization of Law, 2 J. OF LEGAL STUD. 125, 129–35 (1973). There is no question that failure to report and
investigate code violations can lead to tragic circumstances. See Kristin J. Bender & Brian Melley, Death Toll Grows
to
36
at
Oakland
Warehouse
Fire,
OBSERVER
REP.
(Dec.
5,
2016),
http://www.observerreporter.com/20161205/deathtollgrowsto36atoaklandwarehousefire;
Katrina
Lamansky,
Deadly Warehouse Fire in Oakland, CA Prompts Criminal Investigation, WQAD NEWS 8 (Dec. 6, 2016),
http://wqad.com/2016/12/06/deadly-warehouse-fire-in-oakland-ca-prompts-criminal-investigation/. At least one
large city posted information so that its residents may report code violations after the Oakland, California fire
tragedy. See Press Release, Office of the Mayor of Philadelphia, Joint Statement on Deadly Oakland Warehouse
Fire (Dec. 7, 2016). Even if code violations are reported, complaints are only the first step in obtaining compliance
as code officers may need to gain entrance into the property to determine if violations exist for citation purposes.
The Oakland, California warehouse fire involved structures that had been built inside the warehouse without permits
where the property was being used as a residence. See Phil Willon & Matt Hamilton, Building Inspectors Had Not
Been Inside Oakland Warehouse in 30 years, Officials Say, LA TIMES (Dec. 7, 2016),
http://www.latimes.com/local/california/la-me-ln-oakland-fire-inspections-20161207-story.html. An inspector who
visited the warehouse fifteen days before the fire to investigate a possible illegal interior building structure was
unable to get inside, even after complaints were made. Id.
135.
Further, local governments have limited financial resources and personnel to enforce code violations.
Without the public’s help, code compliance departments would be seriously deterred in finding code violations. See
Bennett v. Walton Cty., 174 So. 3d 386, 392–93 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2015); City of Delray Beach v. St. Juste, 989
So. 2d 655, 656–57 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2008).
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making mobile home park owners responsible. The rationale for this view is that
there are unique factors in the relationship between mobile home owners and mobile
home park owners.136 However, it should be noted that if a mobile home park owner
knowingly ignores violations on its real property resulting from acts of a mobile
home owner as described in Sections 723.022, 723.023, and 723.024 of the Florida
Statutes, there could still be responsibility implicated onto a mobile home park owner
by a local government.137
E. To Report or Not to Report, That Is the Question: Risk and Reward of
Reporting Violations
Section 723.024 of the Florida Statutes can be seen as a vehicle that promotes a
number of different grounds of responsibility between a mobile home park owner
and mobile home owner. While the statute may exempt mobile home park owners
from being strictly responsible for code violations resulting from the acts of mobile
home owners, does the statute suggest that if there is an exemption from
responsibility, there is an obligation to report code violations? Section 723.024 of
the Florida Statutes does not direct a mobile home park owner to report code
violations, but if a mobile home park owner will not be responsible for code
violations resulting from mobile home owners acts if they are reported, then a mobile
home park owner needs to take responsibility and report code violations as part of
its new agency relationship with local governments.138 If a mobile home park owner
fails to report code violations resulting from mobile home owners conduct, then that
could place the mobile home park owner a step closer to being named a responsible
party if it sits back and remains silent. While the zone of risk case law cited earlier
in this article139 should apply regardless of the possible exemption contained in
section 723.024 of the Florida Statutes, if the mobile home park owner could be seen
as having foreseen a zone of risk, especially in light of the encouragement this statute
appears to provide to a mobile home park owner to report code violations, then by
sitting back the mobile home park owner could be considered as an active member
in a scheme or design that both the mobile home park owner and the mobile home
owner have developed.140 Besides potential civil liability that might be imposed, if
the mobile home park owner ignores code violations, there could be a breach of a
legal duty by ignoring code violations; as the time horizon grows from the date of

________________________
136.
See Munao, Munao, Munao & Munao v. Homeowners Ass’n of La Buona Vita Mobile Home Park, Inc.,
740 So. 2d 73, 76 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1999).
137.
See discussions supra Part VI and infra Part IX.
138.
FLA. STAT. § 723.024 (2016). All local governments welcome neighborhoods and residents to report
code violations as part of their duty to maintain the health, safety and welfare of the community and maintain high
property values. See, e.g., Code Enforcement, CITY OF ORLANDO, (last visited Apr. 21, 2017)
http://www.cityoforlando.net/code-enforcement/.
139.
See discussion supra Part VI.D.
140.
See discussion supra Part VI. D and infra Part IX.
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any code violations attributable to acts of a mobile home owner, the risk of liability
grows as well.141
While there is a risk in failing to report existing code violations caused by a
mobile home owner, there is also a return risk to a mobile home park owner due to
what might be a statutory exemption from responsibility.142 By reporting code
violations, local government code enforcement should be able to conduct its due
diligence and move toward obtaining compliance in a partnership and agency
relationship between the local government and the mobile home park owner sooner
rather than later.143 By ignoring code violations, the mobile home park owner may
be subjecting itself not only to potential liability in creation of a foreseeable zone of
risk,144 but this inaction may influence a decision by the local government to join the
mobile home park owner as a joint participant in a code enforcement proceeding
against the mobile home owner and the mobile home park owner.145
It makes sense for a mobile home park owner to report code violations resulting
from action or inaction of a mobile home owner on account of the statutory language
contained in section 723.024 of the Florida Statutes and the foreseeable zone of risk
that could be applied to a mobile home park owner if it sits back and ignores code
violations. Under the ambit of section 723.024 of the Florida Statutes, the mobile
home park owner is encouraged to report a code violation resulting from a mobile
home owner.146 The quid pro quo between a local government and a mobile home
park owner is that by reporting code violations, the mobile home park owner may be
exempt from being held responsible for code violations of a mobile home owner
when there is a police partnership and agency relationship between a local
government and a mobile home park owner.147 In essence, agency theory is applied
differently after enactment of section 723.024 of the Florida Statutes, because the
mobile home park owner has become an agent of the local government.148 In
reporting mobile home owners’ code violations, the mobile home park owner helps
the local government maintain the health, safety, and welfare of the community;
through this form of an agency, it is hoped that there will be a better quality of life
for its residents, and the valuation of the mobile home park and local governments’
________________________
141.
See McCain v. Fla. Power Corp., 593 So. 2d 500, 503 (Fla. 1992); Key Largo Ocean Resort Co-Op, Inc.
v. Monroe Cty., 5 So. 3d 31, 32–33 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2009); see City of Pompano Beach v. Yardarm Rest., Inc.,
834 So. 2d 861 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003).
142.
See FLA. STAT. § 723.024 (2016); see Malik, supra note 47, at 251 (1993); Louis Kaplow & Steven
Shavell, Optimal Law Enforcement with Self-Reporting of Behavior, 102 J. POL. ECON. 582, 601 (1994).
143.
See Zuccarelli v. Barfield, 199 So. 3d 399, 406 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2016).
144.
See McCain, 593 So. 2d at 503; Kaisner v. Kolb, 543 So. 2d 732, 735 (Fla. 1989) (“Where a defendant’s
conduct creates a foreseeable zone of risk, the law generally will recognize a duty placed upon defendant either to
lessen the risk or see that sufficient precautions are taken to protect others from the harm that the risk poses.”);
Trianon Park Condo. Ass’n v. City of Hialeah, 468 So. 2d 912, 925 (Fla. 1985) (Ehrlich, J., dissenting); FLA. STAT.
§ 162.09(2)(b) (2016) (providing that the gravity of the violation, any actions taken by the violator to correct, and
prior violations may be considered when imposing a fine).
145.
See discussion infra Part X.
146.
FLA. STAT. § 723.024 (2016); see also Bennett v. Walton Cty., 174 So. 3d 386, 393 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
2015) (Makar, J., dissenting) (discussing a property rented for weddings and other festivities which were the subject
of a code violation that the owners of the property were ultimately held responsible).
147.
See Malik, supra note 47, at 255–56.
148.
See id.
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tax base will be enhanced over the long term.149 The fact that reporting by a mobile
home park owner to a local government is self-serving should be considered
immaterial.
Whether the responsible party is the mobile home owner or the mobile home
park owner, or both, it is a quasi-judicial code compliance proceeding brought by the
local government that will ultimately decide who is responsible after considering the
facts and circumstances of the case.150 However, there is a caveat to these provisions
on responsibility as provided in section 723.024 of the Florida Statutes. There will
be ongoing disputes about which party is ultimately the responsible party for code
violations depending upon the facts and circumstances of the case, whether the local
government charges and prosecutes a code enforcement violation against the mobile
home owner, mobile home park owner, or both.151 Depending on the time and costs
associated with any prosecution or defense, it will not be surprising if one party
attempts to blame-shift and argue that the other party is responsible.152
VII. DO SECTIONS 723.022, 723.023, AND 723.024 OF THE FLORIDA STATUTES
INFRINGE UPON THE SEPARATION OF POWERS DOCTRINE OF ARTICLE II,
SECTION 3 OF THE FLORIDA CONSTITUTION?
The separation of powers doctrine at article II, section 3 of the Florida
Constitution provides as follows: “The powers of the state government shall be
divided into legislative, executive and judicial branches. No person belonging to one
branch shall exercise any powers appertaining to either of the other branches unless
expressly provided herein.”153 These three sovereign powers divide into three
coordinate branches—legislative, executive, and judicial—that strictly prohibit a
person belonging to one branch from exercising any power relating to either of the
other branches unless expressly provided.154
While sections 723.022, 723.023, and 723.024 of the Florida Statutes155 attempt
to bifurcate responsibility between a mobile home owner and mobile home park
owner, does section 723.024(1) of the Florida Statutes156 remove discretion from a
local government code enforcement officer’s decision to file a quasi-judicial action
against a responsible party? Decisions whether to prosecute a violator who is a real
property owner or non-real property owner administratively or civilly rests within
the control of the executive, whether it be the state attorney, who has the authority
________________________
149.
See Schilling, supra note 84, at 149–51; Hipler, supra note 84, at 682–83; Raymond J. Burby, Peter J.
May, Emil E. Malizia & Joyce Levine, Building Code Enforcement Burdens and Central City Decline, 66 J. OF THE
AM. PLAN. ASS’N 143, 144, 147 (2000); Rosser, supra note 46, at 35–36.
150.
See FLA. STAT. §§ 162.06(2), 723.022–723.024 (2016).
151.
See FLA. STAT. § 27.02(1) (2016); Barnett v. Antonacci, 122 So. 3d 400, 405 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2013).
152.
See Steinhorst v. State, 412 So. 2d 332, 338 (Fla. 1982); Chamberlain v. Eisinger, 159 So. 3d 185, 188
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2015); Matthews v. St. Petersburg Auto Auction, Inc., 190 So. 2d 215, 215–16 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1966).
153.
FLA. CONST. art. II, § 3.
154.
Id.; see State v. Cotton, 769 So. 2d 345, 353–54 (Fla. 2000); Pepper v. Pepper, 66 So. 2d 280, 284 (Fla.
1953); Walker v. Bentley, 660 So. 2d 313, 320 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
155.
FLA. STAT. §§ 723.022–723.024 (2016).
156.
Id. § 723.024(1).
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to prosecute or refuse to prosecute a criminal charge,157 or a local government
attorney, who has the authority to prosecute code enforcement violations
administratively or by civil complaint.158 It is fundamental that a local government
attorney has the authority to file, prosecute, abate, settle, or voluntarily dismiss a
building and zoning enforcement action in order to obtain compliance with code
violations.159 The State Attorney has the authority to file, prosecute, abate, settle, or
dismiss criminal cases.160 In all instances, the decision on who to charge and what
charges to bring resides exclusively with the executive branch, not the judicial or
legislative branches.161 The authority to file, prosecute, abate, settle, or voluntarily
dismiss claims are exclusively executive functions and cannot be supervised or
controlled by the judiciary, which has no role in advising, directing, or supervising
a local government on whether to file and prosecute a civil, administrative, or
criminal action.162 Instead, the role of the judiciary is limited to adjudicating any
disputes in an action when it is properly at issue.163 Similarly, the legislature does
not have the right to direct or supervise executive functions of a local government
attorney on whether to file and prosecute a civil, administrative, or criminal action
and against whom charges can be filed.164 The legislature also does not have the right
to hinder or remove the executive branch’s discretion on who to charge and what
charges should be brought.165 The legislature does have the power to enact laws and
declare what the law is, and accordingly after doing so, it rests with the executive
and judicial branch to follow the law, subject to each branch’s exclusive role and
function.166
________________________
157.
See Barnett v. Antonacci, 122 So. 3d 400, 405 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2013); see Freeman v. State, 969 So.
2d 473, 479 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2007).
158.
See Rudge v. City of Stuart, 65 So. 3d 645, 646–47 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2011); City of Jacksonville v.
Blue Stone Constr., Inc., 48 So. 3d 941, 942 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2010).
159.
See Rudge, 65 So. 3d at 646–47; City of Jacksonville, 48 So. 3d at 942; Trianon Park Condo. Ass’n, Inc.
v. City of Hialeah, 468 So. 2d 912, 922 (Fla. 1985); Detournay v. City of Coral Gables, 127 So. 3d 869, 870 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 2013); City of Freeport v. Beach Cmty. Bank, 108 So. 3d 684, 689, 690 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2013).
160.
See, e.g., Young v. State, 699 So. 2d 624, 626–27 (Fla. 1997); State v. Bloom, 497 So. 2d 2, 3 (Fla. 1986).
161.
See Bloom, 497 So. 2d at 3; Cleveland v. State, 417 So. 2d 653, 654 (Fla. 1982).
162.
See Valdes v. State, 728 So. 2d 736, 738–39 (Fla. 1999) (The prosecuting officer, the state attorney, has
complete discretion in deciding whether to charge and prosecute a defendant, and the judiciary cannot interfere with
this discretionary executive function); Bloom, 497 So. 2d at 3 (“Under Florida’s [C]onstitution, the decision to
charge and prosecute is an executive responsibility, and the state attorney has complete discretion in deciding
whether and how to prosecute.”); Johnson v. State, 314 So. 2d 573, 577 (Fla. 1975) (“[T]he discretion of the Attorney
General in choosing whether to prosecute or not to prosecute, or to abandon a prosecution already started, is
absolute.”); Bess v. Reno, 563 So. 2d 95, 96 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1990) (holding that the trial court did not err in
refusing, in effect, to mandamus the state attorney to institute extradition proceedings); Thompson v. Reno, 546 So.
2d 83, 84 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1989) (holding that the state attorney’s discretion extends to civil actions as well as
criminal actions); State v. Jogan, 388 So. 2d 322, 323 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980) (holding that the decision to nolle
prosequi is vested solely with the state attorney’s discretion and cannot be made or supervised by the courts); State
v. C.C.B., 465 So. 2d 1379, 1381 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985) (“In the criminal justice system the discretion to
prosecute or not is a pre-trial posture vested solely in the state attorney’s discretion.”).
163.
FLA. CONST. art. V, §1; but see Trianon Park Condo. Ass’n, Inc., 468 So. 2d at 922; Detournay, 127 So.
3d at 873.
164.
See Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 607 (1985); Chiles v. Children, 589 So. 2d 260, 264 (Fla.
1991); Cleveland, 417 So. 2d at 654.
165.
Wayte, 470 U.S. at 607; Chiles, 589 So. 2d at 263–64; Walker, 660 So. 2d at 320; Bloom, 497 So. 2d at
3; Cleveland, 417 So. 2d at 654.
166.
Wayte, 470 U.S. at 607–08; Chiles, 589 So. 2d at 264; Bloom, 497 So. 2d at 3; Cleveland, 417 So. 2d at
654.
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Whether any statutory prohibition on who may be charged for specially
designated code violations as provided in section 723.024(1) of the Florida Statutes
constitutes a violation of article II, section 3 of the Florida Constitution and the
principle that “no branch may encroach upon the powers of another”167 will have to
await judicial determination. Neither the judiciary nor the legislature have the right
to direct or supervise executive functions of a local government attorney or the State
Attorney on whether to file and prosecute a civil, administrative, or criminal action
and against whom charges may be filed.168 Thus, an argument can be made that if
section 723.024 of the Florida Statutes says that a local government code
enforcement prosecutor can only cite a mobile home park owner or mobile home
owner in specially set circumstances, such enactment might run afoul of the
separation of powers doctrine of article II, section 3 of the Florida Constitution.169
Although there is an inherent distinction between judicial power and quasi-judicial
power according to their respective proceedings,170 the authority to file, prosecute,
abate, settle, or dismiss actions in judicial and quasi-judicial proceedings falls
exclusively within the province of the prosecuting authority, not the legislature or
the judiciary.171
VIII. WHAT EFFECT DOES THE PREEMPTION DOCTRINE IN ARTICLE VIII,
SECTION 2(B) OF THE FLORIDA CONSTITUTION HAVE ON SECTION 723.024 OF
THE FLORIDA STATUTES AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS’ CODE PROVISIONS?
Section 723.024(1) of the Florida Statutes says that a local government shall only
cite and sanction the responsible party, whereas section 723.024(2) says that a local
government may not obtain a lien or fine for any breach of duty other than what is
declared in sections 723.022 and 723.023 of the Florida Statutes.172 There is a risk if
a local government charges a mobile home park owner with a code violation if there
is evidence that a mobile home owner’s acts are the cause of the code violation.173
The preemption doctrine, which is found in article VIII, section 2(b) of the Florida
Constitution,174 provides that local governments lack authority to craft their own
exceptions to general state laws, ”except as otherwise provided by law,”175 and it
establishes the constitutional superiority of the legislature’s power over the power of
local governments.176 Although local governments generally have “the power to
enact legislation concerning any subject matter upon which the state Legislature may

________________________
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.

See Chiles, 589 So. 2d at 264; Walker, 660 So. 2d at 320.
See supra notes 154, 157, 159–64 and accompanying text.
See id.
See Laborers’ Int’l Union, Local 478 v. Burroughs, 541 So. 2d 1160, 1161–62 (Fla. 1989).
See supra notes 154, 157, 159–64 and accompanying text.
FLA. STAT. §§ 723.024(1)–(2) (2016).
Id.
FLA. CONST. art. VIII, § 2(b).
Id.
Id.
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act,”177 local governments are precluded from taking any action that conflicts with a
state statute in exercising their power.178
In considering the impact of article VIII, section 2(b) of the Florida Constitution
and section 723.004(3) of the Florida Statutes179 to Mobile Home Park Lot
Tenancies, the $64,000 question180 is what may happen if a local government charges
a mobile home park owner and/or a mobile home owner in a code enforcement
proceeding that runs afoul to the literal wording of section 723.024 of the Florida
Statutes? Assuming for the sake of argument that a mobile home park owner fails to
report code violations caused by a mobile home owner where a mobile home park
owner knew or should have known about the violations of local government code
provisions, what impact could this have on a non-compliant mobile home park
owner? If a mobile home park owner knew or should have known about the mobile
home owners code violations and did nothing, the mobile home park owner could be
responsible for taking no measures to correct the code violations as a participant or
accomplice.181 A state preemption argument can be made against joining a mobile
home park owner as a co-respondent in a code enforcement proceeding on account
of sections 723.004(3)182 and 723.024(2) of the Florida Statutes.183 For one, if a local
government ordinance is enacted that allows joinder of a mobile home park owner
in a code enforcement proceeding that is the fault of a mobile home owner according
to the applicable provisions of sections 723.022 and 723.023 of the Florida Statutes,
then that ordinance would be a violation of sections 723.004(3) and 723.024 of the
Florida Statutes.184 Similarly, if a local government ordinance is enacted that allows
joinder of a mobile home owner in a code enforcement proceeding that is the
responsibility of a mobile home park owner according to the applicable provisions
of Sections 723.022 and 723.023 of the Florida Statutes, then that ordinance would
be a violation of Sections 723.004(3) and 723.024 of the Florida Statutes.185 Chapter
723 takes priority over any local government ordinance relating to Mobile Home
Park Lot Tenancies, in the absence of legislative authority permitting deference to a
local government or joint and dual authority over a subject matter that does not
specifically exist at this time.186 Therefore, the preemption doctrine of the article
________________________
177.
FLA. STAT. § 166.021(3) (2016).
178.
City of Palm Bay v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 114 So. 3d 924, 928 (Fla. 2013).
179.
FLA. STAT. § 723.004(3) (2016) (“It is expressly declared by the Legislature that the relationship between
landlord and tenant as treated by or falling within the purview of this chapter is a matter reserved to the state and
that units of local government are lacking in jurisdiction and authority in regard thereto. All local statutes and
ordinances in conflict herewith are expressly repealed.”).
180.
The $64,000 Question, PBS, http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/amex/quizshow/peopleevents/pande06.html (last
visited Nov. 22, 2016) (“The $64,000 Question” was an American game show broadcast from 1955 to 1958, which
became embroiled in the 1950s quiz show scandals.).
181.
See discussion infra Part X; supra Part VI.C–E.
182.
FLA. STAT. § 723.004(3) (2016) (“It is expressly declared by the Legislature that the relationship between
landlord and tenant as treated by or falling within the purview of this chapter is a matter reserved to the state and
that units of local government are lacking in jurisdiction and authority in regard thereto. All local statutes and
ordinances in conflict herewith are expressly repealed.”).
183.
See id. § 723.024.
184.
See id. §§ 723.004(3), 723.022–723.024.
185.
See id.
186.
See City of Palm Bay v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 114 So. 3d 924, 928–29 (Fla. 2013);
City of Aventura v. Masone, 89 So. 3d 233, 235–36 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2011), rev’d sub nom. 147 So. 3d 492, 494–
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VIII, section 2(b) Florida Constitution should prohibit any duly enacted ordinance
that conflicts with Chapter 723, and more particularly section 723.024 of the Florida
Statutes.187
Article VIII, section 2(b) Florida Constitution needs to be considered before a
local government charges a mobile home owner and mobile home park owner with
a code violation. The only way a local government can act concurrently and jointly
file charges against a mobile home owner and a mobile home park owner is if an
ordinance is permitted to co-exist under state law.188 But that may not be likely on
account of section 723.004 (3) of the Florida Statutes.189 However, if there was a
bona fide dispute as to who is responsible for certain code violations listed in sections
723.022, 723.023, and 723.024 of the Florida Statutes, common sense should prevail
and allow a local government to join a mobile home owner and the mobile home
park owner in the same or separate administrative proceedings for a determination
of who is the responsible party. If both are joined in the same proceeding, the special
magistrate should be able to air out which of the parties is responsible after
considering the circumstances of the case, depending on whether there is substantial,
competent evidence to support a conviction against one or both parties.190 If only one
party is charged independently of the other in a code enforcement proceeding and
cleared, then the other party could be charged in a successive proceeding in
determining whether there is substantial, competent evidence to support a
conviction, as long as he or she was not charged and adjudicated in an initial
proceeding.191 There is no constitutional or statutory prohibition against separate
administrative proceedings against different parties, as long as there is substantial,
competent evidence to support which party is responsible for a code violation in an
initial or successive administrative hearing.192 However, the doctrine of res judicata
is applicable to rulings and decisions of administrative bodies, thus barring a
successive prosecution against the same party under identical facts and
circumstances.193
________________________
96 (Fla. 2014); see also City of Orlando v. Udowychenko, 98 So. 3d 589, 595–96 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2012), aff’d,
147 So. 3d 492 (Fla. 2014).
187.
See City of Palm Bay, 114 So. 3d at 928–29; Masone, 89 So. 3d at 235–36, rev’d sub nom. 147 So. 3d at
494–96; see also Udowychenko, 98 So. 3d at 595–96.
188.
See Masone, 147 So. 3d at 501 (Pariente, J., dissenting).
189.
See id.; FLA. STAT. §§ 723.004(3), 723.022–723.024 (2016).
190.
See Bd. of Cty. Com’rs. v. Snyder, 627 So. 2d 469, 474–75 (Fla. 1993); De Groot v. Sheffield, 95 So. 2d
912, 916 (Fla. 1957); Town of Mangonia Park v. Palm Beach Oil, Inc., 436 So. 2d 1138, 1139 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1983).
191.
See White v. School Bd., 466 So. 2d 1141, 1141 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985); Rubin v. Sanford, 168 So.
2d 774, 774–75 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1964), cert. denied 180 So. 2d 331, 331 (Fla. 1965).
192.
See Rubin, 168 So. 2d at 774–75; Snyder, 627 So. 2d at 474–75; De Groot, 95 So. 2d at 916.
193.
Hollingsworth v. Dep’t. of Envtl. Regulation, 466 So. 2d 383, 384, 386 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985);
Doheny v. Grove Isle, Ltd., 442 So. 2d 966, 970 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983); Metro. Dade Cty. Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs
v. Rockmatt Corp., 231 So. 2d 41, 44 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1970). As mentioned, res judicata would apply between
the local government and the party involved in the proceeding if either tried to re-litigate the case with the same
facts and circumstances thereby precluding a second bite of the apple in the absence of a different set of facts and
circumstances. If a code enforcement order was entered by a special magistrate, and no appeal or a late appeal was
taken by the losing party, under such circumstances there would be no jurisdiction by a circuit court to consider an
appeal. See Kirby v. City of Archer, 790 So. 2d 1214, 1215 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001); City of Ft. Lauderdale v.
Bamman, 519 So. 2d 37, 38 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1987).
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By deciding to join a mobile home park owner and a mobile home owner in a
code violation proceeding, sections 723.022, 723.023, and 723.024 of the Florida
Statutes need to be considered, but until there is a definitive ruling about the statutes’
impact, a local government should be able to proceed with charging one or both
parties if the evidence warrants.194 If there is evidence showing that a mobile home
park owner or a mobile home owner, or both, caused the code violations, the sole
issue is whether there is substantial, competent evidence to support a conviction.195
If that is shown, then as long as fundamental due process is provided to the parties,
such a procedure should allow a special magistrate to decide which of the parties is
responsible so that a fine and lien can be imposed against one or both of the violating
parties.196 It is also important to keep in mind that section 723.024(1) of the Florida
Statutes emphasizes that only the responsible party shall be charged, and as always,
as long as the local government does its due diligence in making that determination,
even in considering section 723.024(2) of the Florida Statutes, it should be the quasijudicial proceeding that ought to decide responsibility.197
IX. DOES SECTION 723.024 OF THE FLORIDA STATUTES VIOLATE THE ACCESS
TO COURTS PROVISION LOCATED IN ARTICLE I, SECTION 21 OF THE FLORIDA
CONSTITUTION?
A. Does Section 723.024 of the Florida Statutes Provide Procedural Pitfalls
and Barriers that Result in a Violation of Article I, Section 21 of the
Florida Constitution?
Section 723.024 of the Florida Statutes bifurcates responsibility between mobile
home owners and mobile home park owners.198 Is the legislature’s attempt to
negotiate distinctions in responsibility between mobile home owners and mobile
home park owners workable? Is there too much emphasis by local governments in
providing an “an expeditious, effective, and inexpensive method”199 to enforce code
violations of a local government without regard to the entirety of the evidence? In
light of the statute’s attempt to define which party is responsible for a code violation,
does this statute violate the access to courts provision that is found in article I, section
21 of the Florida Constitution?200 Section 723.024 of the Florida Statutes places
________________________
194.
See Snyder, 627 So. 2d at 475; De Groot, 95 So. 2d at 916; Town of Mangonia Park, 436 So. 2d at 1139.
195.
See Snyder, 627 So. 2d at 475; De Groot, 95 So. 2d at 916; Town of Mangonia Park, 436 So. 2d at 1139.
196.
FLA. STAT. §§ 162.07(1), (4); 162.09(1)–(3) (2016).
197.
See discussion supra Part VI; infra Part XII.
198.
FLA. STAT. § 723.024 (2016).
199.
Id. § 162.02.
200.
See Maronda Homes v. Lakeview Res. Home Ass’n, 127 So. 3d 1258, 1272-73 (Fla. 2013). Section
723.004(5) may preserve the right to sue in a civil action by providing an aggrieved party with the right to enforce
a duty in a civil action after a party exhausts its administrative remedies. Section 723.0381(1) may also appear to
preserve the right to sue in a civil action by providing an aggrieved party with the right to enforce a duty; however,
if a local government prosecutes a code enforcement violation against either the mobile home park owner or the
mobile home owner, a decision by the special magistrate could be res judicata against the losing party and preclude
an aggrieved party from filing a civil action in circuit court. Florida district courts have ruled that failure to appeal
a special magistrate’s order within thirty days bars an aggrieved party from later contesting identical code violations
that were raised or that could have been raised before the special magistrate on the grounds of res judicata. See FLA.
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responsibility on either the mobile home park owner or the mobile home owner on
specifically described violations,201 and by doing so the statute may fail to provide a
reasonable alternative for the aggrieved party to challenge a code charge in light of
Article I, Section 21 of the Florida Constitution.202 Section 723.038 of the Florida
Statutes provides that a party may demand mediation to settle a dispute before an
action is filed in circuit court,203 and if mediation is unsuccessful either party may
file an action in circuit court pursuant to section 723.0381(1) of the Florida
Statutes.204 While these two statutes appear to preserve the right to enforce a duty in
circuit court for an aggrieved party,205 in light of section 723.024 of the Florida
Statutes’s strict codification of what is and is not a violation by a mobile home owner
and mobile home park owner before any evidence is presented, this statute may
effectively eliminate access to the courts by limiting responsibility only to those
identified in the statutes regardless of the evidence.206
Article I, section 21 of the Florida Constitution does not necessarily require a
complete inability to gain access to the courts for there to be a violation of this
constitutional provision.207 If a statute produces procedural pitfalls and difficulties
so problematical and time-consuming that such procedures impede meaningful
litigation of the merits of a cause, then such impediments to filing suit may make it
improbable to proceed, which results in a violation of article I, section 21 of the
________________________
STAT. § 162.11 (2016) (governing appeals from final orders of code enforcement boards, which states: “An appeal
shall be filed within 30 days of the execution of the order to be appealed”); Kirby v. City of Archer, 790 So. 2d
1214, 1215 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996) (owner must appeal an adverse code enforcement ruling to the circuit court,
not wait to challenge the facts after commencement of a foreclosure action on an adverse lien filed against the
property owner); City of Miami v. Cortes, 995 So. 2d 604, 606 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2008) (circuit court was without
jurisdiction on a certiorari review of a code enforcement board’s mitigation order that reduced an earlier imposed
fine when the property owner had plead guilty to the code violation and failed to appeal the enforcement order);
Verdi v. Metro. Dade Co., 684 So. 2d 870, 871 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996) (when a special magistrate renders a ruling,
the case is res judicata and cannot be retried later in a foreclosure action); Hardin v. Monroe Cty., 64 So. 3d 707,
711 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2011) (while an earlier unappealed violation order is res judicata, an aggrieved party may
timely appeal from a later entered enforcement order); City of Ft. Lauderdale v. Bamman, 519 So. 2d 37, 38 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1987) (notice of appeal to the circuit court was timely filed as to a supplemental order of the board,
but that failed to bring up for review the final order entered earlier, which had in all respects become final after thirty
days of its entry).
201.
FLA. STAT. § 723.024 (2016).
202.
Id. § 723.024; see also N. Fla. Women’s Health Servs. v. State, 866 So. 2d 612 (Fla. 2003); Mitchell v.
Moore, 786 So. 2d 521 (Fla. 2001); Kluger v. White, 281 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 1973).
203.
FLA. STAT. § 723.038 (2016).
204.
Id. § 723.0381(1).
205.
Id. §§ 723.038, 723.0381(1).
206.
Id. § 723.024; see also Mitchell, 786 So. 2d at 524-28 (Fla. 2001) (copy requirement of the Prisoner
Indigency statute is unconstitutional and violates article I, section 21 of the Florida Constitution because it results
in an insurmountable obstacle to a prisoner’s right to access the courts); Kluger, 281 So. 2d 1 (aggrieved party denied
opportunity to litigate against defendant in tort for property damage arising from an automobile accident by
abolishing tort claim against defendant and by making aggrieved party look to property damage with one’s own
insurer violates article I, section 21 of the Florida Constitution). Assuming arguendo that the statute is not
unconstitutional on its face, one must question whether requiring an aggrieved party to comply with these conditions
and barriers that have been mentioned might be unconstitutional as applied to an aggrieved mobile home owner who
is effectively shut out of legitimately contesting code violations in civil court. See Volusia Cty. v. Aberdeen at
Ormond Beach, 760 So. 2d 126 (Fla. 2000) (Volusia County’s public school impact fees were held to be
unconstitutional as applied to mobile home park that provides housing for persons at least fifty-five years of age or
older); Dep’t of Law Enf’t v. Real Prop., 588 So. 2d 957 (Fla. 1991) (forfeiture act was held not to be unconstitutional
on its face, but was not constitutional as applied to property owner).
207.
See supra note 206.
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Florida Constitution.208 A code enforcement proceeding brought pursuant to Chapter
162 of the Florida Statutes begins and ends the dispute and results in res judicata
barring a future civil action.209 Only fundamental due process applies in quasijudicial proceedings.210 Before a civil suit is filed, there is an available option for a
mediation according to section 723.038 of the Florida Statutes if the parties believe
that a resolution is possible, but that procedure may be nothing more than an attempt
to extend the litigation by a party that is costly and time consuming.211 If pre-filing
procedures do not work, after a civil suit is filed the assigned judge may order nonbinding arbitration according to section 723.0381(2) of the Florida Statutes with its
attendant costs.212 Once a civil suit is filed, a judge could still order mediation before
trial.213 By imposing such barriers before a civil court reaches the merits (if it ever
does reach the merits), when these procedures are used separately or together they
can result in insurmountable burdens and a chilling effect that are problematical to
an aggrieved mobile home owner, who usually has less funds to spend on litigation
than a mobile home park owner.214 Therefore, article I, section 21 of the Florida
Constitution may come into play on account of the procedural and substantive
pitfalls and difficulties that limits civil litigation of the merits by a mobile home
owner in light of the specifically described violations that is provided in sections
723.022, 723.023, and 723.024 of the Florida Statutes.215
The attempt to determine responsibility by section 723.024 of the Florida
Statutes is not black and white.216 There is no reason to believe that this statute should
conclusively determine which party is or is not responsible for a violation making
disputes about responsibility in mobile home parks likely to occur.217 Whether
________________________
208.
Id.
209.
See Kirby v. City of Archer, 790 So. 2d 1214, 1215 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996); City of Miami v. Cortes,
995 So. 2d 604, 606 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2008); Verdi v. Metro. Dade Co., 684 So. 2d 870, 871(Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1996); Hardin v. Monroe Cty., 64 So. 3d 707, 711 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2011).
210.
See FLA. STAT. §162.07(3) (2016).
211.
Id. § 723.038. While pre-filing mediation is discretionary with the parties, if used each party must pay a
filing fee toward the ultimate fee to be charged by the appointed mediator.
212.
See Fla. R. Civ. Pr. 1.820; FLA. STAT. § 723.0381(2) (2016) (granting the trial court the option to order
non-binding arbitration). The purpose of Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.820 motion for trial is to accelerate the
litigation, make the parties evaluate the arbitration award, and either accept it or bring it to an end through trial. See
Nicholson-Kenny Capital Mgmt. v. Steinberg, 932 So. 2d 321, 325 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2006); Stowe v. Universal
Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 937 So. 2d 156, 158 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2006).
213.
See Fla. R. Civ. Pr. 1.700.
214.
See Aspen-Tarpon Springs Ltd. P’ship v. Stuart, 635 So. 2d 61, 63 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
215.
Aspen-Tarpon Springs, 635 So. 2d at 63; see also FLA. STAT. §§ 723.022, 723.023, 723.024, 723.038,
723.0381(2) (2016); City of Miami v. Cortes, 995 So. 2d 604, 606 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2008); Verdi v. Metro. Dade
Co., 684 So. 2d 870, 871 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996); City of Ft. Lauderdale v. Bamman, 519 So. 2d 37, 38 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1987).
216.
See Holly v. Auld, 450 So. 2d 217 (Fla. 1984); Media Whiteco Outdoor v. Dep’t of Trans., 795 So. 2d
991 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001);
217.
See Flo-Sun, Inc. v. Kirk, 783 So.2d 1029, 1037-38 (Fla. 2001); Panama City Beach Cmty.
Redevelopment Agency v. State, 831 So. 2d 662, 665-69 (Fla. 2002); Las Olas Tower v. City of Ft. Lauderdale, 742
So. 2d 308, 312 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1999); Steinhorst v. State, 412 So. 2d 332, 338 (Fla. 1982); Chamberlain v.
Eisinger, 159 So. 3d 185, 188-89 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2015); Matthews v. St. Petersburg Auto Auction, Inc., 190 So.
2d 215, 216 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1966). By analogy, rezoning matters can be considered quasi-judicial proceedings
thereby granting local governments great deference when making a ruling. See Samara Dev’p Corp. v. Marlow, 556
So. 2d 1097 (Fla. 1990); Graham v. Estuary Props., Inc., 399 So. 2d 1374 (Fla. 1981); Public Employees Relations
Comm’n v. Dade Cty. Police Benevolent Ass’n, 467 So. 2d 987 (Fla. 1985); Daniel v. Fla. State Turnpike Auth., 213
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section 723.024 of the Florida Statutes violates the access to courts provision located
in article I, section 21 of the Florida Constitution has not been decided. However,
nothing should be assumed because the Florida Supreme Court has ruled that placing
undue burdens and barriers onto an aggrieved party as a condition precedent to filing
and pursuing a civil suit may result in a constitutional challenge based on article I,
section 21 of the Florida Constitution.218
B. Are Consideration of Equitable Claims and Defenses by Special
Magistrates Ample to Placate the Access to Courts Provision of Article I,
Section 21 of the Florida Constitution?
If a special magistrate may consider equitable claims in code enforcement
proceedings, will that process alleviate concerns about an aggrieved party’s access
to fairness and justice? While local governments have maintained that special
magistrates do not have the authority to consider equitable defenses in code
enforcement proceedings,219 there are a handful of legal decisions suggesting that
special magistrates have authority to consider equitable defenses to code
enforcement prosecutions upon proper proof.220 In Siegle v. Lee County,221 a Florida
appellate court ruled that laches may be applied upon proper proof in a code
enforcement proceeding to a long-standing code violation if a local government
knew or should have known of the violations and did nothing for years.222 Equitable
defenses such as estoppel, laches, and due process might bar enforcement, especially
when a local government has taken some affirmative action to permit the code
violation or to allow it to continue for years without objection.223 Thus, laches,
estoppel, and due process are not inapplicable to code enforcement proceedings and
may be raised subject to proper proof in accordance with the judicial doctrine of
equity and fair play.224
________________________
So. 2d 585 (Fla. 1968); Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs of Brevard Cty., Fla. v. Snyder, 627 So. 2d 469 (Fla. 1993); Sw.
Ranches Homeowners Ass’n, Inc. v. Broward Cty., 502 So.2d 931 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1987).
218.
See Mitchell, 786 So. 2d at 524-28; Kluger, 281 So.2d 1.
219.
Florida case law has suggested that equitable defenses are only available in local government code
enforcement proceedings under rare and exceptional circumstances because code enforcement is a governmental
function for the benefit of the general public. See Siegle v. Lee Cty., 198 So. 3d 773, 774-75 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
2016); Castro v. Miami-Dade Cty. Code, 967 So. 2d 230, 233-34 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2007); Nat’l City Bank of
Cleveland, 902 So. 2d 233, 235 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2005). While that doctrine remains alive today, there are more
recent district court decisions suggesting that code enforcement proceedings that are quasi-judicial proceedings can
consider issues concerning equity, fair play, and due process. See Siegle, 198 So. 3d 773; Monroe Cty. v. Carter, 41
So. 3d 954 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2010); Castro, 967 So. 2d 230; National City Bank of Cleveland, 902 So. 2d 233.
220.
See supra note 219.
221.
Siegle, 198 So. 3d 773.
222.
Id. at 778.
223.
See Siegle, 198 So. 3d 773; Monroe Cty., 41 So. 3d 954; Castro, 967 So. 2d 230; Nat’l City Bank of
Cleveland, 902 So. 2d 233.
224.
See supra note 223. The list may virtually be endless, and perhaps in future cases any other matter besides
estoppel, laches, and due process might constitute an avoidance or defense. See Powell v. City of Sarasota, 953 So.
2d 5, 6 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2006) (city’s nuisance abatement efforts were aimed at African-American neighborhoods
and amounted to selective enforcement); Westgate Tabernacle, Inc. v. Palm Beach Cty., 14 So. 3d 1027 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 2009) (city’s special exception code provision did not violate religious activities of church property that
was used as a shelter for the homeless).
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One must question whether the state legislature has ruled out the possibility that
a local government may charge either a mobile home owner or mobile home park
owner, or both, with code violations in light of the wording of section 723.024 of the
Florida Statutes.225 In light of the statute’s use of “may” and “shall,” did the
legislature intend to say that a violation of one provision of the statute was conclusive
rather than prima facie evidence of a code violation that would effectively preclude
local governments from retaining discretion to prosecute either a mobile home owner
or mobile home park owner, or both, with code violations based upon whether there
is substantial, competent evidence to support a code violation?226 It is more likely
that the legislature left open for local governments a flexible framework to achieve
an equitable result based upon proper proof,227 as distinguished from a literal and
dead letter reading of the statute.228 However, even if the latter approach is applied,
there are still a growing number of Florida appellate court decisions that permit
special magistrates in code enforcement proceedings to consider equitable factors
before deciding if there is a code violation.229 Section 723.024 of the Florida Statutes
should be read in light of article II, section 3 of the Florida Constitution,230 case law
permitting use of equitable defenses of property owners based on the evidence
presented at special magistrates’ hearings that is now precedent in code enforcement
proceedings,231 and existing precedent that grants deference to local governments in
interpretation and enforcement of code provisions.232
X. ARE CONSPIRACY, COLLUSION, AND AIDING AND ABETTING SUBJECT TO
QUASI-JUDICIAL CODE ENFORCEMENT PROCEEDINGS?
Besides the statutory guidelines in sections 723.022, 723.023, and 723.024 of
the Florida Statutes specifying which party is responsible, there may be other
methods for local governments to show by substantial, competent evidence that a
mobile home owner and mobile home park owner are jointly responsible for code
violations.233 Florida jurisprudence allows conspiracy and collusion claims in a civil
________________________
225.
FLA. STAT. § 723.024 (2016).
226.
See DeJesus v. Seaboard Coast Line R.R., 281 So. 2d 198 (Fla. 1973); Grand Union Co. v. Rocker, 454
So. 2d 14, 16 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984); Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Kimmel, 465 So. 2d 606 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985).
227.
See Trytek v. Gale Indus., Inc., 3 So. 3d 1194, 1202 (Fla. 2009); Palm Beach Cty. Canvassing Bd. v.
Harris, 772 So. 2d 1273, 1287 (Fla. 2000); State v. DC, 114 So. 3d 440 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2013).
228.
See David A. Strauss, The Living Constitution, UNIV. OF CHICAGO LAW SCHOOL, THE RECORD (ALUMNI
MAGAZINE), http://www.law.uchicago.edu/alumni/magazine/fall10/strauss (last visited Mar. 8, 2017).
229.
Siegle, 198 So. 3d 773; Monroe Cty., 41 So. 3d 954; Castro, 967 So. 2d 230; Nat’l City Bank of
Cleveland, 902 So. 2d 233.
230.
See supra Part VII.
231.
See Siegle, 198 So. 3d at 776-78; Monroe Cty., 41 So. 3d 954; Castro, 967 So. 2d 230; Nat’l City Bank
of Cleveland, 902 So. 2d 233.
232.
See Verizon Fla., Inc. v. Jacobs, 810 So. 2d 906, 208 (Fla. 2002) (An “agency’s interpretation of the
statute it is charged with enforcing is entitled to great deference.”); see also BellSouth Telecomms., Inc. v. Johnson,
708 So. 2d 594, 596 (Fla. 1998); PW Ventures, Inc. v. Nichols, 533 So. 2d 281, 283 (Fla. 1988); Orange Park Kennel
Club, Inc. v. State, Dep’t of Bus. & Prof’l Reg., 644 So. 2d 574, 576 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1994) (“An agency’s
construction of a statute which it administers is entitled to great weight and will not be overturned unless the agency’s
interpretation is clearly erroneous; the agency’s interpretation need not be the sole possible interpretation or even
the most desirable one; it need only be within the range of possible interpretations.”).
233.
See discussion infra Part IX; supra Parts V.D–E.
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action.234 In Town of Surfside v. Higgenbotham,235 an appellate court ruled that a
victim could state a cause of action by adequately pleading and proving conspiracy
to conceal the discharge of a firearm.236 In Southern Alliance Corporation v. City of
Winter Haven,237 the court ruled that employees’ egregious actions in enforcing a
city’s code by service of a cease and desist order emanating from the city’s Standard
Fire Prevention Code and Life Safety Code could state a cause of action.238 There, a
local law enforcement and fire department concluded that a business allowed
“overcrowding” after an inspection of the business premises by the police and fire
department and the execution of the order was handled egregiously according to the
lounge’s second amended complaint.239 While Higgenbotham and Southern Alliance
Corporation involved cases against a local government for civil liability, the courts
stated that these sorts of claims against complicit and collusive parties could state a
cause of action for civil conspiracy that would make the tenant and owner of the real
property jointly responsible.240
Besides conspiracy and collusion charges that could be filed against a mobile
home park owner and mobile home owner in civil liability proceedings,241 there
remains the possibility of aiding and abetting charges allowing a conviction of the
principal and his or her accomplice. Under Florida law, those who actually commit
the offense and those who aid, abet, or procure the commission of an offense are
treated the same, regardless of their role in the commission of the offense or whether
they are present during the final acts of the offense.242 While there are few, if any,
civil conspiracy or aiding and abetting cases that have been prosecuted in code
enforcement quasi-judicial proceedings, by knowingly remaining silent and failing
to report a mobile home owner’s actions, such conduct could suggest a cover-up of
code violations against the mobile home park owner’s accomplice, as well as the
mobile home owner’s principal.243 Regardless of section 723.024 of the Florida
Statutes, it is still possible for a local government to charge and argue that a mobile
home park owner’s failure to report a code violation, attributable to the mobile home
owner’s action, is tantamount to participation in civil collusion, conspiracy, and
aiding and abetting, as long as it can be determined by direct evidence or inferred
from circumstantial evidence that there was a definitive act in support of any code
________________________
234.
See Charles v. Fla. Foreclosure Placement Ctr., LLC, 998 So. 2d 1157, 1159–60 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
2008); Jacksonville Ferry Co. v. Stockton, 23 So. 557, 559 (Fla. 1898).
235.
Town of Surfside v. Higgenbotham, 733 So. 2d 1040 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1999).
236.
Id. at 1042–43.
237.
S. All. Corp. v. Winter Haven, 505 So. 2d 489 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1987).
238.
Id. at 491–92, 494.
239.
Id. at 492.
240.
See Town of Surfside, 733 So. 2d at 1041–43; S. All. Corp., 505 So. 2d at 494, 496.
241.
See supra note 240.
242.
State v. Dene, 533 So. 2d 265, 267 (Fla. 1988); Potts v. State, 430 So. 2d 900, 902 (Fla 1982); Connolly
v. State, 172 So. 3d 893, 913 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2015).
243.
Administrative agencies can construe a cover-up or aiding and abetting as a violation of an administrative
rule. See Flo-Sun, Inc. v. Kirk, 783 So. 2d 1029, 1039 (Fla. 2001); Mack v. Dep’t of Fin. Serv., 914 So. 2d 986, 989
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2005); Sch. Bd. v. Hargis, 400 So. 2d 103, 107 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981). While these decisions
involve a number of different administrative agencies, they also suggest that these sorts of decisions could apply to
code violations in a code enforcement action against a real property owner and tenant, as well as a mobile home
park owner and mobile home owner.
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violations.244 Whether or not there was a quid pro quo between a mobile home owner
and mobile home park owner in a mobile home park owner’s failure to report code
violations is immaterial as long as both parties agreed directly or indirectly not to
correct code violations and they both sat back and ignored them; such action could
be considered as a cover-up of what was unlawfully done and not corrected, making
them both subject to prosecution in a quasi-judicial code enforcement proceeding.245
XI. WHO IS THE RESPONSIBLE PARTY IN MOBILE HOME PARK LOT
TENANCIES?
A. Statutory Construction Doctrines: Can Sections 162.09(3) and 723.024
of the Florida Statutes Be Construed Together?
In considering the language in sections 162.09(3) and 723.024 of the Florida
Statutes, can these statutes be construed together? A fundamental rule of statutory
construction is that statutes that relate to the same or a closely related subject are
regarded as in pari materia and must be compared with each other and construed
together.246 This legal doctrine requires courts to construe related statutes together
so that they explain each other and are harmonized if possible.247 Section 162.09(3)
of the Florida Statutes specifically provides: “A certified copy of an order imposing
a fine, or a fine plus repair costs, may be recorded in the public records and thereafter
shall constitute a lien against the land on which the violation exists and upon any
other real or personal property owned by the violator.”248 On the other hand, section
723.024(1) provides that “the unit of local government shall cite the responsible
party for the violation . . . ,”249 and section 723.024(2) provides:
A lien, penalty, fine, or other administrative or civil proceeding may
not be brought against a mobile home owner or mobile home for any
duty or responsibility of the mobile home park owner under
s. 723.022 or against a mobile home park owner or mobile home
park property for any duty or responsibility of the mobile home
owner under s. 723.023.250
________________________
244.
Charles v. Fla. Foreclosure Placement Ctr., LLC, 988 So. 2d 1157, 1159–60 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2008)
(explaining that civil conspiracy requires: (1) an arrangement between two or more parties; (2) for an unlawful act
or to do a lawful act by an unlawful means; (3) performing of an overt act in pursuance of the conspiracy; and (4)
damage as result of the acts done under the conspiracy).
245.
See discussion supra Parts VII.A, C–E.
246.
See Fla. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot. v. Contractpoint Fla, Parks, L.L.C., 986 So. 2d 1260, 1265–66 (Fla. 2008);
Holly v. Auld, 450 So. 2d 217, 222 (Fla. 1984) (Shaw, J., dissenting) (“The majority interpretation also violates the
cardinal rules of statutory interpretation which say that statutes should be read in pari materia and all provisions
should be given effect where possible.”); Ferguson v. State, 377 So. 2d 709, 710–11 (Fla. 1979); Alachua Cty. v.
Powers, 351 So. 2d 32, 40 (Fla. 1977); Singleton v. Larson, 46 So. 2d 186, 190 (Fla. 1950).
247.
See Fla. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 986 So. 2d at 1265–66; Holly, 450 So. 2d at 222; Ferguson, 377 So. 2d at
710–11; Powers, 351 So. 2d at 40; Singleton, 46 So. 2d at 190.
248.
FLA. STAT. § 162.09(3) (2016).
249.
Id. § 723.024(1).
250.
Id. § 723.024(2).

https://lawpublications.barry.edu/barrylrev/vol22/iss2/2

32

: Do Code Violations and Liens Run with the Land?

Spring 2017

Do Code Violations and Liens Run with the Land?

189

In as much as sections 162.09(3) and 723.024 of the Florida Statutes are
interconnecting statutes, they should be read together before reaching a conclusion
about the legislative intent of section 723.024 of the Florida Statutes.251 However, in
light of their differences, a question remaining is: Can this be done? Section
162.09(3) of the Florida Statutes and section 723.024 of the Florida Statutes seem to
remain inconsistent and even incompatible, and if that is the case, then they may or
may not be able to be read together.252
Another principle of statutory construction is that a specific statute covering a
particular subject area controls over a statute covering the same subjects in more
general terms.253 The rationale of this tenet is that a more specific statute is
considered to be an exception to the general terms of the more general statute.254 This
tenet may or may not apply here because both sections 162.09(3) and 723.024 of the
Florida Statutes are specific, except that it can be argued that section 723.024 of the
Florida Statutes may be more specific than section 162.09(3), as section 723.024 of
the Florida Statutes applies only to mobile home park owners and mobile home
owners, whereas section 162.09(3) of the Florida Statutes applies to all violators who
own land and provide that a code violation and lien run with the land.255
Within Chapter 162, the legislature created a comprehensive statutory scheme
that sets forth the role of quasi-judicial proceedings in code enforcement actions.256
Part and parcel to this chapter is the paradigm that code violations and liens run with
the land in quasi-judicial and civil proceedings involving code enforcement
violations.257 Upon enactment of section 723.024 of the Florida Statutes, if the
legislature attempted to carve out an exception that only applies to mobile home park
tenancies, then the next step is to look at the literal interpretation of each statute and
if it leads to an unreasonable result, a cardinal rule of statutory interpretation is that
there must be a clear statement by the legislature to partially annul section 162.09(3)
of the Florida Statutes, which does not exist.258 Section 723.024 of the Florida
Statutes has a number of ambiguities and inconsistencies, and therefore if it is
determined that an unreasonable result rule of statutory construction results in a
________________________
251.
Heart of Adoptions, Inc. v. J.A., 668 So. 2d 189, 198–99 (Fla. 2007), superseded by statute, FLA. STAT.
§ 63 (2016) as recognized in Children’s Home Soc’y of Fla. v. V.D., 188 So. 3d 920, 922 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2016);
Joshua v. City of Gainesville, 768 So. 2d 432, 435 (Fla. 2000).
252.
See Knowles v. Beverly Enter.-Fla, Inc., 898 So. 2d 1, 9 (Fla. 2004); Holly, 450 So. 2d at 222; Killearn
Homes Ass’n v. Visconti Family, Ltd. P’ship, 21 So. 3d 51, 53–54 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2009).
253.
See Sch. Bd. v. Survivors Charter Sch., Inc., 3 So. 3d 1220, 1233 (Fla. 2009); McKendry v. State, 641
So. 2d 45, 46 (Fla. 1994).
254.
See Survivors Charter Sch., Inc., 3 So. 3d at 1233 (explaining that in construing statutes, a specific
statute governing a particular subject takes precedence over a conflicting more general statute); People Against Tax
Rev. Mismanagement, Inc. v. Cty. of Leon, 583 So. 2d 1373, 1377 (Fla. 1991); see also State v. Raydo, 713 So. 2d
996, 1001 (Fla. 1998); McKendry, 641 So. 2d at 46 (“[A] specific statute covering a particular subject area always
controls over a statute covering the same and other subjects in more general terms.”). Where a specific and general
statute are inconsistent, “[t]he more specific statute is considered to be an exception to the general terms of the more
comprehensive statute.” McKendry, 641 So. 2d at 46.
255.
FLA. STAT. § 723.024 (2016); see id. § 162.09.
256.
See id. § 162.09.
257.
See Henley v. MacDonald, 971 So. 2d 998, 1000 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2008); Monroe Cty. v. Whispering
Pines Assocs., 697 So. 2d 873, 875 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
258.
See Holly v. Auld, 450 So. 2d 217, 219 (Fla. 1984); Blankfeld v. Richmond Health Care, Inc., 902 So.
2d 296, 300–01 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2005).
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partial annulment at section 162.09(3) of the Florida Statutes, then section 162.09(3)
could still prevail, or there would be great deference to local governments in
determining whether both parties could be charged.259
It is fair to examine any necessary and appropriate alternative legal theories so
that the statutes can be interpreted together in order to give effect to
the legislative intent.260 Although one might argue that the legislative intent was to
carve out an exception to section 162.09(3) of the Florida Statutes as it relates to
mobile home park lot tenancies, based upon the literal wording of section 723.024
of the Florida Statutes261 in evaluating section 723.024 of the Florida Statutes,
paragraph (1) provides that “the unit of local government shall cite the responsible
party for the violation,” whereas paragraph (2) provides that an “administrative or
civil proceeding may not be brought against a mobile home owner or mobile home
park owner for any duty or responsibility” resulting from the other and as provided
for in sections 723.022 and 723.023 of the Florida Statutes.262 Section 723.024 of the
Florida Statutes is not clear and is conflicting and results in an ambiguity that
undermines its clarity by its use of “may” and “shall” in different parts of the statute
that appear to permit a local government to charge either a mobile home owner or
mobile home park owner, or both, with identical code violations.263
Another issue with this statute is that its introduction fails to exclude any other
Florida statute. Section 723.024 of the Florida Statutes provides: “Notwithstanding
any other provision of this chapter or of any local law, ordinance, or code . . . .” This
statute attempts to define who can be charged and under which circumstances code
violations can be applied against responsible parties.264 The qualifying language in
the first sentence of Section 723.024 of the Florida Statutes provides that there
should be no other provision of Chapter 723 or of any local law, ordinance, or
provision that is inconsistent with section 723.024 of the Florida Statutes, but leaves
out important words, such as any other provision of law or statute in section 723.024
of the Florida Statutes.265 The legislature failed to specify that any other Florida
statute that is inconsistent with section 723.024 of the Florida Statutes has been
________________________
259.
See Flo-Sun Inc. v. Kirk, 783 So. 2d 1029, 1037 (Fla. 2001); Panama City Beach Comm. Redevelopment
Agency v. State, 831 So. 2d 662, 665–69 (Fla. 2002); Las Olas Tower v. City of Fort Lauderdale, 742 So. 2d 308,
311–14 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1999).
260.
See Blanton v. City of Pinellas Park, 887 So. 2d 1224, 1230 (Fla. 2004); Joshua v. City of Gainesville,
768 So. 2d 432, 435 (Fla. 2000).
261.
See Scott Gordon, New Law May Help Manufactured Housing ROCs Deal With Code Violations,
FLORIDA ROC (June 23, 2011),
http://www.floridaroc.com/2011/06/articles/news-of-note-for-rocs/new-law-may-help-manufactured-housing-rocsdeal-with-code-violations/; Florida Statute 723.024, THE RICHARDS LAW GROUP (June 23, 2011),
http://www.richardslawgroup.com/rlg/florida-statute-723-024/. These commentaries were written shortly after
enactment of the statute, but they do not discuss or raise the questions made in this article. Only time will tell how
section 723.024 of the Florida Statutes is construed.
262.
See discussion supra Parts VI.A and XI.A–B; FLA. STAT. §§ 723.022–723.023 (2016).
263.
See supra note 262.
264.
See generally FLA. STAT. § 723.024 (2016).
265.
See City of Miami v. McGrath, 824 So. 2d 143, 154 (Fla. 2002) (explaining that the statute in question
specifically repealed inconsistent laws); Flo-Sun, Inc., 783 So. 2d at 1034 (providing that the air and water pollution
section 403.191 of the Florida Statutes constitutes an additional and cumulative remedy to abate pollution).
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overruled or repealed if it is inconsistent with section 723.024 of the Florida
Statutes.266
Another issue is that if section 723.024 is read literally, this statute may have the
effect of partially repealing approximately thirty years of code enforcement law and
procedure that is contrary to long term precedent and policy.267 Ever since Chapter
166 of the Florida Statutes was enacted, local governments’ code enforcement
purpose and strategy has been to make a real property owner ultimately responsible
for code violations and liens that run with the land.268 Long-standing agency and
strict liability principles have existed since the inception of Chapter 166 of the
Florida Statutes.269 There is a long-term historical recognition by the legislature and
the judiciary that code violations and liens run with the land.270
B. Is There a Way to Reconcile Section 723.024 of the Florida Statutes and
Section 162.09(3) of the Florida Statutes?
Although courts are required to interpret statutory language together to give
effect to the legislature’s intent,271 the inconsistent use of the words “may” and
“shall” in section 723.024 of the Florida Statutes, and the failure of the legislature to
expressly override prior Florida statutes that are not contained in section 723.024 of
the Florida Statutes, conveys a confusing and inconsistent meaning of legislative
intent.272 However, if a local government can decide who is the responsible party
after code violations are investigated, then such a construction might permit a local
government to charge one or both parties with identical code violations in order for
the special magistrate to air out code violation charges by determining whether one
or both of the parties are responsible for the code violations in mobile home park lot
tenancies. Thus, a reasonable construction of section 723.024 of the Florida Statutes
in light of section 162.09(3) of the Florida Statutes is to allow local governments to
prosecute mobile home owners and mobile home park owners for code violations as
long as there is substantial, competent evidence to support a conviction.273 Of course,
this could occur after the special magistrate considers the criteria provided in
sections 723.022 and 723.023 as guidance to a local government rather than a legal
obstacle or barrier to prosecuting code violations and whether there is substantial
________________________
266.
See FLA. STAT. § 723.024 (2016); Forsythe v. Longboat Key Beach Erosion Control Dist., 604 So. 2d
452, 454–56 (Fla. 1992); Wilson v. Palm Beach Cty., 62 So. 3d 1247, 1250 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2011);
City of Coconut Creek v. Broward Cty. Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs, 430 So. 2d 959, 963 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983).
267.
See Henley v. MacDonald, 971 So. 2d 998, 1000 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2008); Monroe Cty. v. Whispering
Pines Assocs., 697 So. 2d 873, 875 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1997); City of Gainesville Code Enf’t Bd. v. Lewis, 536 So.
2d 1148, 1150 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1988).
268.
See Henley, 971 So. 2d at 1000; Whispering Pines Assocs., 697 So. 2d at 875; City of Gainesville Code
Enf’t Bd., 536 So. 2d at 1150; FLA. STAT. §§ 162.06(05), 162.09(3) (2016).
269.
See discussion supra Section IV.
270.
See supra notes 1–3, 39–41 and accompanying text.
271.
See discussion supra Part XI.
272.
See Heart of Adoptions, Inc. v. J.A., 963 So. 2d 189, 198–99 (Fla. 2007); Willis Shaw Express, Inc. v.
Hilyer Sod Inc., 849 So. 2d 276, 278–79 (Fla. 2003); Palm Beach Cty. Canvassing Bd. v. Harris, 772 So. 2d 1220,
1229–30 (Fla. 2000).
273.
See Panama City Beach Comm. Redevelopment Agency v. State, So. 2d 662, 665–69 (Fla. 2002); FloSun, Inc. v. Kirk, 783 So. 2d 1029, 1037 (Fla. 2001).
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competent evidence to sustain the charges.274 This is an approach that is necessary
and reasonable because it may be difficultif not impossibleto determine who is
the responsible party by merely looking at section 723.024 of the Florida Statute
without granting local governments the prerogative to decide which of the parties
ought to be charged in determining if there is substantial, competent evidence to do
so.275
There is still uniformity of enforcement of code violations if a local government
retains deference to decide responsibility in accordance with the evidence, but is not
mandated to follow section 723.024 of the Florida Statutes.276 If a local government
retains deference to decide whether to charge a mobile home owner or mobile home
park owner or both, it can determine whether there is a violation based upon the facts
and circumstances of the case.277 In determining which party is responsible, a local
government special magistrate ought to be open to questions concerning common
areas in mobile home parks, which can become embroiled in disputes involving
boundary and use restrictions imposed by a mobile home park owner’s declarations
documents.278 Habitability, including lot cleanliness of a mobile home owner, can be
impacted by excessive flooding and stagnant standing water, which could be the
result of properly or improperly designed and constructed water drainage systems
coming from common areas that are the responsibility of a mobile home park
owner.279 Erosion of the land where the mobile home rests may occur, resulting in a
residential lot’s demise that grounds a residential shelter.280 Mosquito infestation and
other dangerous conditions may arise on account of leaking and runoff from a
defective drainage system that does not fulfill its intended purpose resulting in an
uninhabitable shelter and lot.281 Restrictions on the use of, ingress to, or egress from
a mobile home owner’s residence can impact habitability.282
Section 723.024 of the Florida Statutes incorporates each party’s general
obligations and seems to make it simple to determine which party is responsible, but
underlying facts and circumstances can make it complex to determine which party is
responsible in maintaining compliance with local government code provisions and
________________________
274.
See Sarasota Cty. v. Bow Point on the Gulf Condo. Developers, LLC, 974 So. 2d 431, 432–33 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 2007); Orange Cty. v. Lewis, 859 So. 2d 526, 528 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003); Richbon, Inc. v. Miami-Dade
Cty., 791 So. 2d 505, 508 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001).
275.
See Killearn Homes Ass’n, Inc. v. Family Ltd. P’ship, 21 So. 3d 51, 52–53 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2009);
Pilgrim v. Crescent Lake Mobile Colony, 582 So. 2d 649, 651–52 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991); Pappert v. Mobilinium
Assocs. V., 512 So. 2d 1096, 1097–99 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1987).
276.
Florida law suggests that great deference must be given to a local government’s interpretation of a statute,
except when construction is “clearly erroneous,” because local government officials have an expertise that lay
persons do not. See Verizon Fla., Inc. v. Jacobs, 810 So. 2d 906, 908 (Fla. 2002); BellSouth Telecomms., Inc. v.
Johnson, 708 So. 2d 594, 596 (Fla. 1998).
277.
See supra note 276. The legislature has delegated to local governments the authority to prosecute code
enforcement violations and the power to enforce section 723.024 of the Florida Statutes. See Ch. 162, Fla. Stat.
(2016).
278.
See Walton Cty. v. Stop Beach Renourishment, 998 So. 2d 1102 (Fla. 2008); Carlandia Corp. v.
Obernauer, 695 So. 2d 408 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1997); Tower House Condo., Inc. v. Millman, 410 So. 2d (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1981); Hidden Harbour Estates, Inc v. Basso, 393 So. 2d 637 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981).
279.
See FLA. STAT. §§ 723.022, 723.023, 723.024 (2016).
280.
Id.
281.
Id.
282.
Id.
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utilities, infrastructure, and common areas.283 Yet if section 723.024 of the Florida
Statutes is literally read, the onus for repair and maintenance could be wrongly
placed onto the mobile home owner.284 Expert engineers would have to determine
responsibility, and defects in common areas or infrastructure are more readily
discoverable by mobile home park owners, who are better suited financially than are
mobile home owners, who live on restricted budgets.285 What can result is that
responsibility for keeping a lot habitable might unfortunately fall on a mobile home
owner rather than a mobile home park owner regardless of the underlying facts and
circumstances of the case.286
An unknown number of code violations remain unnoticed or, worse, they may
have been ignored by real property owners for years, and this includes violations
existing in mobile home parks, which may have ignored long standing code
violations on their real property out of fear of being prosecuted by local
governments.287 In light of the potential for varying interpretations of section
723.024 of the Florida Statutes that have been discussed in this article, the questions
to be determined by local governments are: Which party is the responsible party; is
the mobile home park owner or the mobile home owner solely responsible for their
own violations, or can they both be responsible based on the facts and circumstances
of the case; and if one or both are responsible, can an order be certified and recorded
in the public records for lien purposes regardless of section 723.024 of the Florida
Statutes?
XII. IS ONE OR SEVERAL QUASI-JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS PERMISSIBLE IN
DETERMINING WHO IS A RESPONSIBLE PARTY?
Would it not be in the best interest of the local government to charge a mobile
home owner and a mobile home park owner if there is a question of who is the
________________________
283.
See id. §§ 723.022, 723.024. This would, in all likelihood, include responsibility for repairs and
replacement of roads, surface water management systems, and drainage pipes, among other things that are part of
the common property. See Maronda Homes v. Lakeview Res. Home Ass’n, 127 So. 3d 1258, 1269–70 (Fla. 2013).
284.
FLA. STAT. § 723.024 (2016).
285.
See Maronda Homes, 127 So. 3d at 1269–70; Aspen-Tarpon Springs Ltd. P’ship v. Stuart, 635 So. 2d
61, 63 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1994) (district court of appeal acknowledged that mobile home park owners and mobile
home owners have an “economically unbalanced bargaining position” that favors mobile home park owners).
286.
Aspen-Tarpon Springs, 635 So. at 63.
287.
See discussion supra Part V. Some violations include overgrown vegetation, landscaping, and failure to
clean away trash and debris culminating in an onslaught of rodents, vermin, and mosquitoes; failure to maintain real
property and upkeep of dwellings by a mobile home owner involving structural damage that presents a danger to
residents and neighbors; failure to abide by regulations that required clearance of lots, junk, abandoned vehicles,
and debris sitting for excessive periods of time that result in danger, rust, filth, and rubbish; failure to correct fire
and electrical code violations attributable to a mobile home owner’s neglect, carelessness, or abandonment;
construction of an addition without a building permit that is not up to code that can be easily blown away during
high winds and storms, and that is dangerous. See Harry M. Hipler, Do Code Enforcement Violations “Run with the
Land”? Competing Interests of Local Governments and Private Parties and Their Constitutional Considerations in
Code Enforcement Proceedings, 43 STETSON L. REV. 257, 258 (2013); Harry M. Hipler, Special Magistrates in
Code Enforcement Proceedings: Local Government Agents or Arbiters of Fairness and Justice, 38 STETSON L. REV.
519, 519–20 (2008); Jason Gibilisco, How Code Enforcement Mitigates Hoarding in the Community, 465 SJSU
SCHOLAR
WORKS:
MASTER’S
PROJECT,
1,
5–10,
http://scholarworks.sjsu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1465&context=etd_projects.
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responsible party? This option may be the most expedient and least expensive
alternative as the time and costs associated with resolving a dispute in one
administrative proceeding is a supporting reason to join both parties in the same
proceeding so as to give them an opportunity to provide evidence as to responsibility
based upon the facts and circumstances.288 Evidence can be presented by the local
government, and the land owner and non-real property owner can be given the
opportunity to present evidence on their own behalf to refute charges so that all
interested parties air out the evidence and present their defenses in the same
proceeding.289 When circumstances warrant, a single proceeding is best for the
parties and a local government, rather than piecemeal or multifaceted proceedings
that invariably costs more and may result in longer, protracted proceedings before
administrative finality and certainty is reached.290 The question whether the mobile
home owner and mobile home park owner ought to be joined in one proceeding
should remain open for consideration by local government counsel, and this should
be regarded as an option rather than a necessity for local government counsel after
considering whether a mobile home owner and/or the mobile home park owner
should be charged separately or jointly. If section 723.024 of the Florida Statutes is
followed literally and only one party is charged, there is nothing to preclude the party
appearing in a quasi-judicial proceeding from making an argument and presenting
evidence that the non-joined party is responsible; and if it turns out that the party
charged is not responsible, a subsequent prosecution could be filed against the nonjoined party to determine responsibility in a subsequent proceeding.291
There should be no question that Chapter 162 of the Florida Statutes, along with
sections 723.022, 723.023, and 723.024 of the Florida Statutes, require local
governments to act with due diligence in determining which party is responsible for
code violations after considering the statutory factors provided in these statutes and
local government regulations.292 This can be accomplished only after there is
consideration of the facts and circumstances of the code violations in determining

________________________
288.
See discussion supra Parts VI.A, C–E, X.
289.
See Horne v. USDA, 133 U.S. 2053, 2062–64 (2013) (Horne I); Horne v. USDA, 135 U.S. 2419, 2433
(2015) (Horne II). For purposes of this article, Horne I is pertinent, because the Supreme Court of the United States
ruled that the Ninth Circuit had jurisdiction to consider Horne’s case. The US Supreme Court first ruled that Horne’s
attempt to avoid the AMAA by restructuring his farm as a combined raisin grower and handler was ineffective,
because the law applied to Horne, and his challenge to the raisin reserve was ripe. The Supreme Court of the United
States also concluded that the Tucker Act did not require Horne to sue in the Court of Federal Claims, because the
AMAA had a comprehensive regulatory scheme. Consequently, the case was remanded to the Ninth Circuit to
consider the merits of Horne’s takings claim in the same proceeding.
290.
Horne I, 133 U.S. at 2062–64; Horne II, 135 U.S. at 2433; Delray Med. Ctr., Inc. v. State, Agency for
Health Care, 5 So. 3d 26, 29–30 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2009); Wood v. Dep’t of Prof. Reg., 490 So. 2d 1079, 1081–82
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1986); see Austin Tupler Trucking, Inc. v. Hawkins, 377 So. 2d 679, 681 (Fla. 1979).
291.
Equitable estoppel was an issue raised in Castro v. Metro-Dade County Code Enforcement, but the
language in this decision calls attention to the possibility of disputes as to which party is responsible. Castro v.
Metro-Dade Cty. Code Enf’t., 967 So. 2d 230, 234 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2007) (“One party will not be permitted to
invite another onto a welcome mat and then be permitted to snatch the mat away to the detriment of the party induced
or permitted to stand thereon.”).
292.
FLA. STAT. §§ 162.06–162.08, 723.022–723.24 (2016).
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whether there is substantial, competent evidence to support a conviction.293 Who
other than the local government code enforcement prosecution counsel and team is
uniquely qualified to decide who should be charged and for which violations?294 In
any quasi-judicial hearing before a special magistrate, the respondents should be able
to make whatever defenses they deem necessary and proper; if either party disagrees
with the result of the code enforcement hearing, then an appeal by way of a writ of
certiorari can be filed in the circuit court to consider the ruling and any issues that
were raised in the quasi-judicial proceeding.295
XIII. SECTION 723.024 OF THE FLORIDA STATUTES AND THE IMPACT OF
SELECTIVE PROSECUTION AND ENFORCEMENT
A local government must be careful not to selectively enforce code enforcement
ordinances against similarly situated parties.296 A local government must
evenhandedly and uniformly enforce any type of code violations against all persons
in the same or similarly situated positions.297 If a local government is charged with
selectively enforcing violations against one violator but not others in similar or
identical situations, this could result in protracted disputes and litigation, causing a
lack of trust and confidence in the local governments’ credibility and the prospect of
potential money damage awards against the local governments if selective
prosecution and enforcement is proved.298
XIV. CONCLUSION
The enactment of section 723.024 of the Florida Statutes raises many questions
that have yet to be resolved. Ever since the enactment of section 162.09(3) in 1987,
code enforcement violations and liens have run with the land.299 After section
723.024 of the Florida Statutes became effective on June 2, 2011, the question
became whether the legislature has carved out an exception for mobile home park
lot tenancies to bifurcate responsibility between mobile home owners and mobile
home park owners.300 Section 723.024 of the Florida Statutes says that each of these
parties has its own responsibility in mobile home park lot tenancies, which is a
________________________
293.
See Sarasota Cty. v. Bow Point on the Gulf Condo. Developers, LLC, 974 So. 2d 431, 432–33 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 2007); Orange Cty. v. Lewis, 859 So. 2d 526, 528 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003); Lee Cty. v. Sunbelt Equities,
II, Ltd. P’ship,, 619 So. 2d 996, 1003 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
294.
See discussion supra Part VII.
295.
FLA. STAT. § 162.11 (2016); Kirby v. City of Archer, 790 So. 2d 1214, 1215 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001).
296.
See Zuccarelli v. Barfield, 199 So. 3d 399, 405–06 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2016); Powell v. City of Sarasota,
953 So. 2d 5, 7–8 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2006); Ads in Motion – Fla. Inc. v. City of Fort Lauderdale, 429 So. 2d 806,
806–07 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983).
297.
See Zuccarelli, 199 So. 3d at 405–06; Powell, 953 So. 2d at 7–8; Ads in Motion – Fla. Inc., 429 So. 2d
at 806–07.
298.
See Metro. Dade Cty. Fair Hous. & Emp’t Appeals Bd. v. Sunrise Village Mobile Home Park Inc., 511
So. 2d 962, 965–66 (Fla. 1987); Fla. Dept. of Transp. v. E.T. Legg & Co., 472 So. 2d 1336, 1336–38 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1985); Harry M. Hipler, Special Magistrates in Code Enforcement Proceedings: Local Government Agents or
Arbiters of Fairness and Justice?, 38 STETSON L. REV. 519, 519–20 (2008).
299.
See supra notes 1–3.
300.
See discussion supra Parts II, VI.A.
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reversal of approximately thirty years of code enforcement law and procedure.301
Section 723.024 of the Florida Statutes is deceptively simple, until one studies the
statute and finds that it contains inconsistencies and contradictions.302 The wording
of section 723.024 of the Florida Statutes undermines long-standing agency and
strict liability principles that have existed since the 1980s in code enforcement law
and procedure.303 Section 723.024 of the Florida Statutes arguably removes agency
and strict liability from section 162.09(3) of the Florida Statutes as it pertains to
mobile home park lot tenancies. By enacting section 723.024 of the Florida Statute,
the legislature appears to have involved itself in attempting to reshape code
enforcement law and procedure, and it has placed itself into the dynamics of real
property owners and lessees’ responsibilities in code enforcement violations and
liens with the help of mobile home park owners’ interest groups.304
There are still questions that remain after the enactment of section 723.024 of
the Florida Statutes. Is the statute’s wording clear and unambiguous? Does this
statute conflict with the separation of powers doctrine in article I, section 3 of the
Florida Constitution? What effect does the preemption doctrine in article VIII,
section 2(b) of the Florida Constitution have on section 723.024 of the Florida
Statutes and local governments’ code provisions? Is section 723.024 of the Florida
Statutes mandatory or discretionary as to code enforcement law and procedure? Can
section 723.024 be reconciled with section 162.09(3) of the Florida Statutes and can
they both be construed together? Is there a legal duty, as distinguished from a moral
obligation, on mobile home park owners to report mobile home owners to local
governments if there appears to be a code violation? In light of the different
interpretations that can be given to section 723.024 of the Florida Statutes and the
constitutional considerations that need to be addressed, will local governments
decide for themselves how to construe and apply the statute resulting in confusion
and various interpretations from one local government to another?
For the skeptic, why should a discussion about the conflicts within section
723.024 of the Florida Statutes and the tensions existing between that statute and
section 162.09(3) matter? No one is being sent to jail for a crime they did not commit,
as Chapter 162 prosecutions are non-criminal.305 Code enforcement only concerns
________________________
301.
See discussion supra Parts II, XI
302.
See discussion supra Parts II, VI.A, XI.
303.
See discussion supra Parts III–IV.
304.
The Florida Manufactured Housing Association (FMHA) represents the spectrum of park owner
interests. Florida Manufactured Housing Association, Inc., http://www.fmha.org/about-fmha/ (last visited Nov. 22,
2016). Although lobbying is protected free speech, U.S. v. Rumely, 345 U.S. 41, 46 (1953), there is no question but
that interest groups have become powerful organizations that some call a fourth branch of government. See Lloyd
Hitoshi Mayer, What Is This “Lobbying” that We Are So Worried About?, 26 YALE L.J. 485, 528 (2008); Cornelia
Woll, Leading the Dance? Power and Political Resources of Business Lobbyists, 27 J. PUB. POL’Y 57, 65 (2007).
305.
See FLA. STAT. §§ 162.02, 162.06–162.07, 162.09 (2016); see also Thomas v. State, 583 So. 2d 336, 340
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991), aff’d, 614 So. 2d 468, 471 (Fla. 1993) (suggesting that ordinance violations were noncriminal in nature). Article I, section 18 of the Florida Constitution provides that there can be no imprisonment for
local government ordinance violations, “except as provided by law.” In Attorney General Opinion 2009-29, the
Attorney General suggested that a county is an “administrative agency” for purposes of article I, section 18 of the
Florida Constitution, therefore no imprisonment is allowed “except as provided by law.” More specifically, the
Attorney General stated that a county could not enact an ordinance providing that the failure to timely pay a civil
penalty imposed pursuant to Part II of Chapter 162, Florida Statutes, was a criminal misdemeanor, and is therefore
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real and personal property code violations, and these violations can be corrected, so
what is there to fear? Are code violations de minimis in the total scheme of things?
Local governments’ goals in enforcing uniform code provisions is to maintain good
quality, habitable, and livable neighborhoods by obtaining compliance with local
government code regulations, not to assess a tax or special assessment against a real
property owner and violator.306 What harm can result even if the mobile home park
owner and the mobile home owner/tenant ignore code violations, especially when
local governments may substantially mitigate or abate accrued fines upon
compliance with local government code regulations?307 These are some of the
concerns raised by residents and property owners who may claim “so what” as to the
impact of section 723.024 of the Florida Statutes.
The enactment of section 723.024 of the Florida Statutes may effectively change
what has been long standing policy that made landowners strictly responsible for
code violations. If it is determined that this statute results in a bifurcation of
responsibility between mobile home owners and mobile home park owners, then
long standing code enforcement law and procedure will be changed between mobile
home park owners and mobile home owners.308 There is tension and conflict within
section 723.024 of the Florida Statutes, as well as between sections 723.024 and
162.09(3) of the Florida Statutes. If these statutes cannot be reconciled and
harmonized then the public may be subjected to varying interpretations from one
local government to another.309 If section 723.024 of the Florida Statutes is construed
literally, that position may make code enforcement less consistent rather than more
consistent with long standing policy of Chapter 162 of the Florida Statutes, which
________________________
proscribed from doing so by article I, section 18 of the Florida Constitution. Still, it would appear that a local
government might be able to enact an ordinance providing for imprisonment as long as a state statute has not
preempted a subject from enactment of laws by local governments. When the legislature takes action and enacts a
statute, a local government cannot adopt or enforce an ordinance that conflicts with the state statute and any penalty
provided by a statute. In Phantom of Clearwater v. Pinellas County, 894 So. 2d 1011, 1021–21 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
2005), the court suggested that a local government could enact an ordinance providing for a penalty as long as it
does not exceed the penalty imposed by the state statute. See also Phantom of Brevard, Inc. v. Brevard County, 3
So. 3d 309 (Fla. 2008), which approved the decision in Phantom of Clearwater. However, if criminal penalties can
be enacted by local governments under these restricted circumstances, any prosecution involving a criminal violation
would have to be filed in county court. See FLA. STAT. § 162.22, Fla. Stat. (2016) (providing enforcement methods:
“These enforcement methods may include, but are not limited to, the issuance of a citation, a summons, or a notice
to appear in county court or arrest for violation of municipal ordinances as provided for in chapter 901.”). Still, the
question of whether a local government should involve itself into criminal matters is left for another day.
306.
See Collier Cty. v. State, 733 So. 2d 1012, 1016 (Fla. 1999); Desiderio Corp. v. City of Boynton Beach,
39 So. 3d 487, 494 (Fla. 2010).
307.
See FLA. STAT. § 162.09(2)(c) (2016).
308.
Is section 723.024 of the Florida Statutes an opening of a Pandora’s Box and of the flood-gates to further
diminution by the legislature of the long-standing principal that code violations and liens run with the land? We will
just have to wait and see. See Collier Cty., 733 So. 2d at 1016.
309.
Flo-Sun, Inc. v. Kirk, 783 So. 2d 1029, 1037–38 (Fla. 2001); Panama City Beach Cmty. Redevelopment
Agency v. State, 831 So. 2d 662, 665–69 (Fla. 2002); Las Olas Tower v. City of Ft. Lauderdale, 742 So. 2d 308,
312–13 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App 1999). In rezoning matters that are considered to be quasi-judicial proceedings, Florida
law grants local governments great deference in their decision-making authority. See Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs of
Brevard Cty., Fla. v. Snyder, 627 So. 2d 469 (Fla. 1993); Samara Dev’p Corp. v. Marlow, 556 So. 2d 1097 (Fla.
1990); Public Employees Relations Comm’n v. Dade Cty. Police Benevolent Ass’n, 467 So. 2d 987 (Fla. 1985);
Daniel v. Fla. State Turnpike Auth., 213 So. 2d 585 (Fla. 1968); Sw. Ranches Homeowners Ass’n, Inc. v. Broward
Cty., 502 So. 2d 931 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1987).
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has made violations and liens run with the land in order to insure quicker and
speedier compliance with code violations.310
While there should be cooperation between residents located in mobile home
parks in mobile home park lot tenancies, is there a guarantee after enactment of
section 723.024 that mobile home park owners and mobile home owners will
cooperate with each other to obtain compliance? Cooperation matters in helping a
community remain habitable and livable; if each real property owner helps the local
government obtain compliance with its uniform code provisions, there is hope that
the values of real property will gradually increase in value, resulting in an increase
in the local government’s tax base as the health, safety, and welfare of the community
is safeguarded for all.311
The legislative enactment of section 723.024 of the Florida Statutes may be
business as usual. Whether special interests got the legislature to carve out an
exception to a long-standing policy that has proven valuable to local governments
and the public for years by exempting mobile home park owners from strict
responsibility for code violations on their land remains open for discussion and
dispute. Until there is a better understanding of the impact and ultimate construction
and enforceability of section 723.024 of the Florida Statutes, these questions will
continue to exist and we will just have to wait and see.

________________________
310.
Henley v. MacDonald, 971 So. 2d 998, 1000 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2008) (explaining that code violation
run with the land and can make title unmarketable by subjecting the buyer to administrative proceedings and
litigation cost after closing); see also FLA. STAT. § 162.02 (2016).
311.
Harry M. Hipler, Do Code Enforcement Violations “Run with the Land”? Competing Interests of Local
Governments and Private Parties and Their Constitutional Considerations in Code Enforcement Proceedings, 43
STETSON L. REV. 257, 297 (2013); see FLA. STAT. § 162.02 (2016).
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